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Abstract 
 
In the interplay between protection of rights and majoritarianism, the court is the arena. This 
research focuses on the conflicting role of the court within a constitutional democracy and a 
contestation of the counter-majoritarian dilemma that emerges from such a role. The counter-
majoritarian dilemma centres on the idea that judges overturning decisions of the legislature 
through judicial review undermines democracy by thwarting the will of the majority through a 
subjective reading of abstract constitutional principles.  
As a point of departure, the counter-majoritarian dilemma is contested by revealing that the 
court can be seen as a democratically consistent institution if democracy can be 
reconceptualised. 
The examination of the South African jurisprudential climate and the adjudicative guidelines 
followed by the court suggests a rejection of such anti-democratic contention. The court 
upholds the commitments consented to at the time of the Constitution’s adoption and 
adjudication is reflective of the values undertaken by the country in reaction to its past. Within 
these values, minority rights can find a lifeline. Thus minority rights can exist through the 
implications of majoritarian consent. This research further identifies, in response to the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma, a constraining self-consciousness on the part of the court and 
an acute awareness of the court’s precarious role within a democratic infancy. The core of the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma is the view that interpretative indeterminacy of the Constitution 
means that the will of the people could be substituted for judicial preference. Through the 
examination of the court’s interpretative strategies and judicial subjectivity, this research 
suggests that within judicial subjectivity, adjudication continues to be reflective of the will of 
the people. Far from a constraining and mechanistic interpretation to avoid judicial 
subjectivity, the research reveals that open and non-formalist interpretative strategies are 
necessary to effectuate democratic conciliation within the judicial mandate. The results of this 
research suggest that, far from being a democratically deviant institution, the court in the 
current South African jurisprudential context, is the most suited to uphold the concept of 
democracy.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background: South Africa as a Constitutional Democracy 
 
The apartheid history of South Africa is one of oppression, discrimination and a denial of 
human rights. This denial ran concurrently with a denial of democratic participation and self-
determination to the majority of the population.  
Despite non-recognition of human rights on the part of the minority-run government, rights 
talk percolated through apartheid South Africa in the form of African Claims in South Africa,1 
an idea of a Bill of Rights adopted by the African National Congress (ANC) in 1945. This was 
followed by The Congress of the People’s The Freedom Charter2 adopted in 1955; the ANC’s 
Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa3 in 1989; and The Bill of Rights for a 
New South Africa4 in 1993. In 1991 the South African Law Commission published its paper 
The Interim Report on Group and Human Rights.5 Rights talk was the mainstay of the 
argument against the anti-democratic apartheid regime. 
 
In 1991 the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) saw multiparty negotiations 
begin to steer South Africa toward a constitutional democracy. Primarily the goal was toward 
peaceful democratic governance, but as is consistent with the basic tenets of constitutional 
democracy, there was a realization that this could not be achieved without a commitment to 
the rule of law and an independent judiciary.6  
 
Within CODESA, a technical committee was charged with constitutional transformation. The 
challenge was how to balance a constitutional framework that ensured rights protection as 
                                               
1
  http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4474 (date accessed 27/06/2015). 
2
  http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=72 (date accessed 27/06/2015); see also Sachs A 
“Towards a bill of rights for a democratic South Africa” 1991 Journal of African Law 21-43 32-
33. 
3
  http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=294 (date accessed 27/06/2015). 
4
  http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=231 (date accessed 27/06/2015); See Currie I and De 
Waal J The  new constitutional and administrative law Vol 1 (Juta Cape Town 2001) 57-58 for 
an overview of these rights documents. 
5
  South African Law Commission Interim Report on Group and Human Rights, Pretoria SALC 
1991. 
6
  Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at para 
17 (hereinafter referred to as First Certification); Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1993 Schedule 4 Constitutional Principle IV, VII and XV (hereinafter referred to as the Interim 
Constitution). 
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well as a constitution that out of democratic necessity and democratic authority was adopted 
by an elected assembly as the embodiment of the will of the people.7 In the drafting of a Bill of 
Rights, the technical committee leaned heavily on the ANC’s constitutional guidelines. These 
guidelines however promoted a Bill of Rights only in-so-far as it was aimed at the fostering of 
majoritarian democracy through free and fair elections.8 Despite such an historical connection 
between right and democracy, it had come to a point where it became, and continues to be, 
viewed as diametrically opposed. 
Although the ANC’s Transition to Democracy Bill contained a number of substantive rights, it 
was qualified by the ANC’s insistence that a final Bill of Rights must be adopted by a duly 
elected Constitutional Assembly.9 Thus, rights would emerge with the direct consent of the 
majority as this would in time, assuredly, come to be an assembly where the ANC would hold 
a large majority and could thereby construct a Bill of Rights to suit ANC objectives. This 
redrafting had the potential to negate an all-party negotiation and agreement. The possibility 
of a derogation of rights once in the hands of an overriding majority presented a danger to 
minority interests. The technical committee, however, apart from the ANC’s draft Bill, also 
embraced the work of academics that produced The Charter for Social Justice, a far more 
comprehensive draft Bill of Rights that went above and beyond a mere stop-gap measure 
between negotiation and election.10 Minority parties, including the National Party, were 
insistent that the final Bill of Rights may not differ greatly from the version that would precede 
democratic entrenchment. 
In the competing forces between majoritarian governance and rights protection, a two stage 
approach was adopted. An Interim Constitution allowed for a power-sharing measure to be 
adopted in which there would be a government of national unity for five years.11 This was 
supported by parties on the agreement that a final Constitution must have democratic 
authority and would thus be written by elected representatives after free and fair elections.12 
Yet minority parties needed assurances that they would not be left unprotected and at the 
mercy of majority rule with no constitutional safeguards yet in existence. Without these 
                                               
7
  Currie and De Waal The new constitutional and administrative law 59-63. 
8
  Technical committee on fundamental rights during the transition: Third Progress Report 28 
MAY 1993 section 3.1 http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3203.PDF; Davis D “Deconstructing 
and reconstructing the argument for a bill of rights within the context of South African 
nationalism” in Andrews P and Ellmann S (eds) The post-apartheid constitutions: perspectives 
on South Africa’s basic law (Witwatersrand University Press 2001) 198 (emphasis added). 
9
  Davis D Democracy and deliberation: transformation and the South African legal order (Juta & 
Co Ltd Cape Town 1999) 3; Davis “Deconstructing and reconstructing the argument for a bill of 
rights within the context of South African nationalism” 198. 
10
  Davis Democracy and deliberation 3. 
11
  Chapter 4 Interim Constitution. 
12
  First Certification at para 12; Dyzenhaus D “Democracy, rights and the law” 1991 South 
African Journal of Human Rights 24-49 41. 
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safeguards in place, minority parties would have walked away from the negotiating table.13 
Assurance was given in the form of an Interim Constitution and in the agreement that a super 
majority of 75 percent would be needed when adopting the final Constitution by the elected 
assembly. In addition, the final constitution adopted by the elected assembly would have to 
comply with the 34 Constitutional Principles drawn up by the negotiating parties, principles 
that would ensure rights protection in the face of majoritarian governance.14 Certification of 
this compliance would be performed by the newly formed Constitutional Court. The draft 
Constitution drawn up by the elected Constitutional Assembly was sent to the Constitutional 
Court with 80 percent of the assembly supporting the draft.15 
 
Pre-1994 South Africa operated under parliamentary sovereignty whereby the judiciary was 
only able to judge the procedural correctness of legislation and was deferential to power of 
the legislature.16 A move from a culture of authoritarianism to one of justification, 
representation, non-discrimination, non-oppressive; an open and democratic society based 
on dignity, equality and freedom would entail a greatly more activist judiciary.17 
 
The new South Africa has a system of constitutional supremacy and the court in this new 
South Africa is charged with a substantive obligation to uphold the Constitution. The court is 
charged with fostering value-based rights jurisprudence. Inherent in this term is the idea that 
the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and in terms of section 2 of the Constitution, 
any law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid.18 The power to declare law or conduct invalid 
with the Constitution rests with the court in accordance with section 172 of the Constitution.19 
                                               
13
  First Certification at para 12. 
14
  Motala Z “Constitution making in divided societies and legitimacy: lessons from the South 
African experience” 2006 Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review 147-163 156-159. 
15
  Rickard C “The certification of the constitution of South Africa” in Andrews P and Ellmann S 
(eds) The post-apartheid constitutions: perspectives on South Africa’s basic law 
(Witwatersrand University Press 2001) 226. 
16
  Du Plessis L “The legitimacy of judicial review in South Africa’s new constitutional 
dispensation: insight from the Canadian experience” 2000 Comparative and International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa 227-247 227-228. See also Sachs v Minister of Justice 1934 AD 11, 
37; Smith v Attorney-General, Bophuthatswana 1984 (1) SA 196 (BSC) and Harris and Others 
v Minister of Interior and Another 1952 (2) SA 428 (A); See also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 37-40 (hereinafter referred to as 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers); Cameron E “Submission on the role of the judiciary under 
apartheid” 1998 South African Law Journal 436-438. 
17
  Mureinik E “A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights” 1994 South African 
Journal of Human Rights 31-48 32. 
18
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as The Constitution). 
19
  See section 165(2) of the Constitution, which reads: "The courts are independent and subject 
only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour 
or prejudice” and Section 165(5): “an order or decision issued by the court binds all persons to 
whom and organs of state to which it applies”; see also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers at para 
44. 
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This power is known as judicial review 20 and is one of the cornerstones of constitutionalism. 
Constitutionalism is defined as placing limitations on power. Such limitations can be seen, 
however, as anti-democratic. The court’s role in upholding rights can be seen as anti-
democratic. It is questioned why the judiciary, through the upholding of constitutional 
provisions, should be allowed to nullify democratic decisions.21 This is the counter-
majoritarian dilemma. 
At the same time, the will of the people must be upheld as the embodiment of the hard-fought 
democracy.22 Thus the court holds a remarkably unsettled mandate in South African 
jurisprudence as it is tasked with upholding rights without fear or favour and yet must respect 
the new democratic order. Emerging out of history and in reaction to history, there is a dual 
commitment on the part of the judiciary that underscores constitutional democracy. There is a 
commitment to both democracy and to rights. This role of the court that centres on rights 
protection however creates tension between majority rule and the power of the court. 
Little has been written about the counter-majoritarian dilemma in the South Africa context. 
This research therefore offers particular relevance within the current discourse of South Africa 
that is increasingly echoing claims of counter-majoritarianism and the court’s role in such 
regard. Increasingly, democracy is being viewed as majoritarianism and decisions emerging 
from majority-rule processes seen as paramount and overriding. Emerging from this there is 
the probability that these attacks on the judiciary and these majoritarian critiques can 
potentially manifest as harm to minorities. President Jacob Zuma said on the floor of the 
National Assembly in 2012: “You have more rights because you are a majority. You have less 
rights because you are a minority. That is how democracy works.”23 Precisely because of 
                                               
20
  Currie and De Waal The new constitutional and administrative law 20-21. 
21
  Du Plessis 2000 CILSA 228-229; see also Currie and De Waal The new constitutional and 
administrative law 30 and 35-37; Rostow E “The democratic character of judicial review” 1952 
Harvard Law Review 193-224 193. Bickel A The least dangerous branch (Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London 1986) x-xi. See also Lochner v New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
(hereinafter referred to as Lochner): "No evils arising from such legislation could be more far 
reaching than those that might come to our system of government if the judiciary, abandoning 
the sphere assigned to it by the fundamental law, should enter the domain of legislation and 
upon grounds merely of justice or reason or wisdom, annul statutes that had received the 
sanction of the people’s representatives." 
22
  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (3) SA 
191 (CC) at para 117-120 (hereinafter referred to as New National Party case). 
23
  News24 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/You-dont-understand-democracy-Zuma-
told 20120914 (date accessed - 25/09/2013). 
Add to this, the ANC Secretary General, in an interview with the Sowetan, referring to the 
Constitutional Court as “mak[ing] nonsense of a democratically elected parliament.” Sowetan 
Live http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2011/08/18/full-interview-ancs-mantashe-lambasts-
judges  (date accessed – 22/06/2015). See also the political attacks on the judiciary in light of 
the High Court of Gauteng, Pretoria’s Al Bashir Ruling Southern Africa Litigation Centre v 
Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development and Others (27740/2015) [2015] 
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such dominance met with majoritarian overtones, the court has an increased role to play in 
minority protections.  
 
1.2   The Problem Statement 
 
The idea of constitutional democracy is inherently contradictory. It holds on the one hand that 
the people shall be self-governing and that the government shall be a government of consent. 
On the other hand, this is juxtaposed with the idea of limited government, where the people’s 
will is manifested as majority rule, cannot be unconstrained.24 There must be body of laws, a 
constitution, that will govern the people and limit their authority and the authority of their 
chosen representatives. The role of the court and the process of judicial review through the 
interpretation and application of that body of laws is thereby seen to undercut the people as 
self-governing. Thus it is contradictory to have majority rule and yet have constraints that are 
imposed on the majority that stems from outside of the majority. There is inherent tension in 
                                                                                                                                              
ZAGPPHC 402 (24 June 2015) (unreported judgment). Noteworthy is that the government 
ignored the high court ruling.  
See News 24 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Newsmaker-Revolution-nostalgia-
rule-Gwede-Mantashe-20150628 where Mantashe accuses the courts of overreaching, 
claiming that the judiciary cannot dictate rules to parliament and such orders from the judiciary 
will be disregarded. Mantashe goes on to equate judicial review to a coup. See also Mail and 
Guardian http://mg.co.za/article/2015-07-08-chief-justice-hammers-gratuitous-criticism (date 
accessed 09/07/2015);  
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Zuma-I-strongly-believe-in independent-judiciary-
20150709 (date accessed – 09/07/2015); See also comments made by Higher Education 
Minister Blade Nzimande at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ANC-tells-judges-to-
back-off-20150621 (date accessed - 09/07/2015): “sections of the judiciary tend to somehow 
overreach into areas that one would expect even in a constitutional state to tread very, very 
carefully… if we don’t debate this, we run the risk of Parliament matters and executive matters 
being run by the courts.” Mantashe continued his anti-judicial dialogue after two high court 
decisions did not hold in favour of the ANC: “There is a drive in sections of the judiciary to 
create chaos for governance; that’s our view,” he said. “We know if it doesn’t happen in the 
Western Cape High Court, it will happen in the Northern Gauteng – those are the two benches 
where you always see that the narrative is totally negative and create a 
contradiction.”http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Gwede-Mantashe-singles-out-
problematic-courts 20150622 (date accessed - 23/06/2015) .This debate is found not just in 
the South African context but in current American legal/political debate. During the Second 
Republican Debate on 16 September 2015, candidate for President, Senator Ted Cruz said: 
“We have an out-of-control Court, and I give you my word, if I'm elected president, every single 
Supreme Court justice will faithfully follow the law and will not act like philosopher kings 
imposing their liberal policies on millions of American.” 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2015/09/16/annotated-transcript-september-
16-gop debate/ (date accessed 30-09-2015). See also Kohn L “The burgeoning constitutional 
requirement of rationality and the separation of powers: has rationality review gone too far?” 
2013 South African Law Journal 810-836 812; Ngcobo S “Sustaining public confidence in the 
judiciary: an essential condition for realising the judicial role” 2011 South African Law Journal 
5-17 5-6. 
24
  Steele Commager H Majority rule and minority rights (Peter Smith Gloucester Massachusetts 
1958) 7-8. 
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these two concepts. The tension between democracy (as majority rule) and constitutionalism 
is further strained when placed in the South African context. 
South Africa emerged from a history where the will of the majority was denied at the hands of 
a minority. Thus a narrative forms whereby democracy (in its narrow conception of winner-
takes-all) and majority rule are to be paramount in reaction to such a past. Anything curtailing 
the power of majority will and democratically elected representatives will be reminiscent of 
that past. As an example of the interplay between majoritarianism and rights jurisprudence, 
Sachs notes that the adoption process of a Bill of Rights in South Africa was inside out, in that 
it was regarded with suspicion by the majority, rather than being seen as an instrument of 
freedom and advancement.25  
Any response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma must therefore be made in light of the 
unique context in which the Constitutional Court of South Africa operates. It is against this 
background that Roux argues the court has to balance legal legitimacy, public support and 
institutional security.26 Within constitutional democracy there is a complex inter-relationship 
between minority rights, populism and the court’s legitimacy that must be understood and 
navigated by the court.27 
The court's awareness of the need to balance pragmatism and principle in order to operate 
and survive in a new democracy means that the nature of the counter-majoritarian dilemma 
takes on a slightly different tone in the South African context. It becomes about protecting 
minority rights in the face of public opinion, majority decisions or popular morality. 
 
The separation of powers doctrine is designed to control the tension. The legislature, as a 
representative democratic body, is to make the law, and the judiciary is to interpret and apply 
the law. The judiciary in applying the rule of law must be seen to be consistent, predictable, 
insulated and independent.
 28 
 The paradox here is that the court must have an independent 
function (read non-democratic function) apart from other institutions in order to justify its role 
                                               
25
  Sachs 1991 JAL 24; Dyzenhaus 1991 SAJHR 28. 
26
  Roux T “Principle and pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa” 2009 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 106 -138. 
27
  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 184 (hereinafter referred to as S v 
Makwanyane). "In a democracy, the law cannot afford to ignore the moral consensus of the 
community…if the law is out of touch with the moral consensus; whether by being too far 
below it or too far above it, the law is bought into contempt.” See also Paine T Rights of man in 
Common sense and the rights of man (Sterling New York 2011) (original work published 1791) 
393. Du Plessis L “The South African constitution as memory and promise” 2000 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 385-394 390. 
28
  Schlag P “The problem of the subject” 1990 Texas Law Review 1627-1743 1663-1664. 
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in a democracy.29 The court will lean toward judicial independence as much as possible as 
this is the source of its institutional legitimacy within a democratic society. This independence 
would prevent the court from inserting itself in the democratic working of government and on 
the other side of the coin; it would prevent political pressure or the political environment from 
being injected into adjudicative matters, challenging the impartiality and functioning of the 
court.30 
 
An important feature of the separation of powers doctrine is, however, the concept of checks 
and balances.31 Reading checks and balances into the separation of powers doctrine 
anticipates that there cannot be independent, insulated silos but there must be interaction and 
conversation between the three spheres.  The overarching scheme of constitutionalism in a 
Supreme Constitution would therefore allow for judicial intrusion into the majoritarian 
sphere.32 The First Certification case noted that there is no “universal model of separation of 
powers” 33  and denied a strict reading of such. 
 
The understanding of the separation of powers doctrine must be coloured by the unique 
contextual and historical factors34 to form a “distinctively South African model.”35 Such 
contextual reading would include a transformative mandate on the part of the court and yet 
leave space for the political to achieve its democratic vision of transformation. The view of 
upholding the fundamental values undertaken by South Africa would envision a greater role 
for the court and such an extensive role must be considered in the design of the separation of 
powers model and the counter-majoritarian claims that would emerge from such a role.  
 
The purpose of the Constitution is, amongst others, to protect the minority; to protect 
difference from power and uphold the fundamental rights, to offer protection and prevent 
abuse.36 Minority rights, due to their very nature, need to be protected and upheld by the 
court. Ackerman noted in the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality that  
                                               
29
  Bickel The least dangerous branch 24; West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette 319 
U.S 654 Justice Frankfurter dissenting: “If the function of this court is to be essentially no 
different from that of a legislature, if the considerations governing constitutional construction 
are to be substantially those that underlie legislation, then indeed judges should not have life 
tenure, and they should be made directly responsible to the electorate.” 
30
  SA Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC) para 26 
(hereinafter referred to as Heath). 
31
  Constitutional Principle VI in Schedule 4 of Interim Constitution.  
32
  First Certification at para 109. 
33
  First Certification at para 108. 
34
  First Certification at para 109. 
35
  Heath referencing De Lange v Smuts 1998 (7) BCLR 779 (CC) at para 24. 
36
  See Mohamed I “The independence of the judiciary” 1998 South African Law Journal 658-
667 665; Steele Commager Majority rule and minority rights 8. 
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Their vulnerability increased by the fact that they are a political minority not able on 
their own to use political power to secure favourable legislation for themselves.
 
They 
are accordingly almost exclusively reliant on the Bill of Rights for their protection.
37
 
 
The court is therefore a necessary counter-weight to the “tyranny of the majority”38 and 
judicial intervention into the democratic workings may be necessary to uphold the 
fundamental commitments undertaken in a Supreme Constitution39 that transcends all 
spheres of government and private relations40. This idea emerges not only from a 
constitutional theory standpoint but is supported by the history of South Africa’s transition to 
democracy, in particular the adoption of the Constitution and establishment of the 
Constitutional Court to assuage minority fears. From its very establishment, the Constitutional 
Court can be seen as intricately connected to minority rights protection. 
The inter-relationship between the court’s legitimacy and the protection of minority rights 
therefore forms the crux of the counter-majoritarian dilemma in South Africa. 
Chaskalson held in his judgment in S v Makwanyane that “public opinion may have some 
relevance to the inquiry” yet the court should not be swayed by public opinion, “its duty is to 
interpret the constitution and uphold its provisions without fear or favour.”41 Part of the duty of 
an independent judiciary is to be objective in its interpretation of the constitutional 
provisions.42 The court, in referencing the case of Furman v Georgia held that public opinion 
lies at the “periphery.”43 Perhaps the most compelling articulation concerning the place for 
minorities within a constitutional democracy is the following reference to West Virginia State 
Board of Education v Barnette made by the Constitutional Court: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
                                               
37
  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 
para 25 (hereinafter referred to as National Coalition); Sunstein C “Naked preferences and the 
constitution” 1984 Columbia Law Review 1689-1732 1711; Cameron E “Sexual orientation and 
the constitution: a test case for human rights” 1993 South African Law Journal 450- 472 
quoting Justice Rand, Canadian Supreme Court 1951 at 471: “The courts in the ascertainment 
of truth and the application of laws are the special guardians of the freedom of unpopular 
causes, of minority groups and interests, of the individual against the mass, of the weak 
against the powerful, of the unique, of the non-conformist…”; Du Plessis 2000 Stell L Rev 390. 
S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) at para 160 (hereinafter referred 
to as S v Lawrence). 
38
  Steele Commager Majority rule and minority rights 8. 
39
  The Constitution section 2. 
40
  The Constitution section 8(2). 
41
  S v Makwanyane at para 88. See also S v Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at para 16 
(hereinafter referred to as S v Mamabolo). 
42
  Mohamed 1998 SALJ 663. 
43
  S v Makwanyane at para 89; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972); Matiso and Others 
v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison, and Another 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE) 594 D 
(hereinafter referred to as Matiso): “[the] function of judicial review, based on the supremacy of 
the Constitution, should not be hidden under the guise of simply seeking and giving expression 
to the will of the majority in Parliament. Judicial review has had a different function…”. 
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officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts…fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the 
outcome of no elections.
 44
 
Despite the assertions that the court should not be swayed by public opinion,45 the 
importance of public opinion as being necessary for judicial legitimacy cannot be ignored, 
especially in South Africa’s constitutional infancy. As Madison noted, the public belief in the 
legitimacy of the court is the only arsenal available to the court.46 It is this need for legitimacy 
that provides the checks and balance for the judiciary, offers a constraining force and the 
answer to the question “who guards the guardians”? 
The presumption that, in stepping outside of the judicial sphere and the rigidity of the plain 
text, law would be seen as anti-democratic is met with an additional and yet contrary 
obligation. When the court upholds minority rights in a way that runs counter to public opinion, 
or institutional policy, the danger is that the court will be seen as anti-democratic, which in 
turn places the legitimacy of the court in danger. If the legitimacy of the court is then 
questioned, protection of minority rights is indirectly jeopardized.47 The defence of minority 
rights must therefore engender a defence of judicial legitimacy.48 
From this outline, legitimacy and institutional security must be achieved through a 
dichotomous focus on both independence and reputation on the part of the court. Reputation 
contains within it further contradictory commitments. First is the acknowledgment that judicial 
                                               
44
  West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) referenced in S v 
Makwanyane at para 89. See http://m.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/Politics/DA-debate-
Merit-vs-Popularity-20150506 where DA parliamentary leader Maimane during a televised 
debate for the leadership of opposition party Democratic Alliance said in regard to the death 
penalty: “[democracy] is for the people, by the people and if the people want to vote on it, they 
must vote on it.” 
26
 Carpenter G “Public opinion, the judiciary and legitimacy” 1996 South African Public Law 110-
122 113: “courts should not be swayed by public opinion, which is not only fickle and 
changeable but may even be irrational.” 
46
  The Federalist No 78 (A Hamilton) http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed78.asp (date 
accessed 01/08/2015); Mohamed 1998 SALJ 661; Ngcobo 2011 SALJ 5-17. 
47
  Zylberberg P “The problem of majoritarianism in constitutional law: a symbolic perspective” 
1992 McGill Law Journal 27-82 41; Motala 2006 Temp Pol  & Civ Rts L Rev 148: “If the 
political system is unable to surmount the legitimacy crisis, the system is likely to face a crisis 
and ultimately rupture.” Madison Federalist 51 referred to in Ely H Democracy and distrust: a 
theory of judicial review (Harvard University Press Cambridge 1980) 80.  Part of Madison’s 
Federalist papers states that there is a “precarious security” when the court “espouse[s] the 
unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party”; Hirschl Towards 
juristocracy: the origins and consequences of new constitutionalism (Harvard University Press 
Cambridge 2004) 153; Friedman B “The birth of an academic obsession: the history of the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma part 5” 2002 Yale Law Journal 153-259 161 says of the 
American constitutional context:  “mid-century liberals lived with the anxiety that the public 
itself ultimately would turn on the Court and endanger a set of results these academics 
approved. The promise of a Court protective of liberty was dear to them, but they were sure 
such an institution inevitably would run afoul of popular opinion, and were sceptical that such 
an institution could exist or survive public disapproval.” 
48
  Mohamed 1998 SALJ 666. 
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reputation is achieved through independence in decision making; decisions that reflect the 
laws of the nation and not the courts own personal preferences. Sustaining the public 
confidence that the court is independent in this regard is crucial. Yet when the counter-
majoritarian dilemma is read into questions of legitimacy, would reputation, in addition, have 
to be understood as incorporating social congruence and popular acceptance within 
judgement when controversy arises? Moreover, when there is an unpopular decision, it 
stands to reason that not the substantive content of the judgment but the independence and 
character of the judiciary will be attacked. This creates a strategic mandate on the part of the 
court to both engage and retreat, to somehow find the balance between timidity and activism, 
deference and protection.49 
 
The counter-majoritarian dilemma is often stated as a zero-sum argument. It assumes that 
the court, in overturning a decision by democratically elected representatives, does so in 
isolation and without consideration of the will of the people and the social context in which the 
court operates.50 It is seen as an either/or relationship where, in order for minority rights to be 
upheld, populism must be denied. In this version of the counter-majoritarian dilemma 
democracy and constitutional supremacy are seen as diametrically opposite. Arising from that 
tension, a necessary incompatibility between minority rights and majority rule is constructed. 
Thus there is a need to integrate the protection of rights within a democratic accord without 
resorting to a timidity of judicial function and an abdication of minority rights in the 
achievement of such a goal. 
 
1.3 Methodology and philosophical approach 
 
Little has been written about the counter-majoritarian dilemma in South African jurisprudence. 
As such this research leans heavily on the literature of American constitutional theorists and 
academic scholarship. The teachings from these American based theories are then examined 
in light of the South African context and the application is critically extended to South African 
jurisprudence.  
                                               
49
  Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) at para 
56 (hereinafter referred to as Prince). 
50
  See Kroeze IJ “Legal research methodology and the dream of interdisciplinarity” 2013 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 35-65 53: “Because law is a social artefact, the 
consideration of legal issues and problems will always and necessarily require looking at 
socio-political and economic factors, for example. This is a conscious and unconscious 
mirroring of what courts do. A judicial decision that looks at legal rules and legal rules only is 
basically impossible.” 
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Writings and commentaries from South African constitutional scholars in journal articles and 
books are used to assess the constitutional climate and provide critical analysis into the 
underlying workings of the Constitutional Court that would underscore any judgment. Primary 
sources of Constitutional Court case law and in particular minority rights judgments are 
examined.51 The Constitution and the Interim Constitution, as well as technical committee 
reports and draft reports as secondary supporting documents are drawn upon. 
 
The research will primarily be driven by a rationalist approach whereby evidence to support 
the central thesis will emerge through a logical consistency of argument. Various 
philosophical schools of thought will be utilized in the examination of the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma. 
 
1.4  Assumptions and limitations 
 
Reference to minority in this research is all encompassing – race, gender, sex, ethnic or 
social origin, sexual orientation, religion, conscience, belief, culture and language. 52 
 
This research begins from the assumption that there is a belief that the court operates with 
disregard of the people's will and the will of elected officials and is thereby in opposition to 
democracy. 
 
It is furthermore assumed that the counter-majoritarian dilemma is becoming more acute in 
the South African context. 
 
It is assumed that minority rights are clearly delineated in the Constitution. As such, the 
research will begin from the assumption that minority rights enjoy remarkably progressive 
constitutional protection within the South African context yet are also vulnerable when 
confronted with majoritarian politics. 
 
The examination of the counter-majoritarian dilemma in this research will be focused on a 
philosophical approach whereby the dilemma is examined in terms of judicial strategy and 
                                               
51
  S v Makwanyane; National Coalition; Prince; Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (5) SA 
331(CC); Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as 
Hoffman); Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life International and Others Amici 
Curiae); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA 
524 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie). 
52
  Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SALR 1012 (CC) at para 31: “Although one thinks in the first 
instance of discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnic origin one should never lose sight 
in any historical evaluation of other forms of discrimination such as that which has taken place 
on the grounds of sex and gender.” 
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interpretative analysis. The arguments of appointment, tenure, accountability and 
representative demographics of the judiciary are, for the purpose of this research, beyond the 
scope. This is not to ignore however that a broader examination of the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma would however have to include these points toward full landscape of argument.  
 
1.5  Hypothesis  
 
The jurisprudential context of South Africa renders claims of counter-majoritarianism 
contestable. The court in its protection of minority rights is not being overly interventionist but 
is rather operating in a manner that is consistent with democratic theory. 
 
1.6  Framework 
 
The counter-majoritarian dilemma is examined from three standpoints: the counter-
majoritarian dilemma within the Constitution, within judicial review and finally within judicial 
subjectivity. 
Chapter 2 outlines the contentions made by the counter-majoritarian dilemma together with a 
brief examination of the dilemma within the broader scheme of a young constitutional 
democracy such as South Africa. The preliminary argument against the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma is that the court is applying the Constitution mandated by the Constitution itself. This 
leads to an examination of how the court engages with the constitutional text. The 
constitutional commitment to value judgements in addition to the argument outlined in this 
chapter regarding the shortfall in engaging in formalist interpretative strategies results, 
however, in interpretative indeterminacy. The contention raised by the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma is that as a result of this indeterminacy, the court engages in adjudication that is not 
based on the Constitution but adjudicates through a subjective interpretation of abstract 
constitutional provisions. The contention is that democratic will is being overridden by 
unbounded judicial preference. The result of interpretative indeterminacy can therefore only 
be a resort to majoritarianism.   
As the core of the counter-majoritarian dilemma is the view that judicial review is anti-
democratic or a deviant democratic institution, the concept of democracy is critically 
examined. Chapter 3 offers a recasting of democracy. Beginning with a rejection of 
majoritarianism as democracy, the research argues that beyond a traditional conception of 
democracy as free and fair elections and winner-takes-all, democracy understood as self-rule 
and a justification of power means that in the current South African climate, the court is the 
13 
  
 
most suited to upholding democracy. Democracy is thereby defended as popular-sovereignty 
reinforcing in addition to democracy being viewed as difference, deliberation and equality. A 
recasting such as this renders the court’s protection of minority rights consistent with 
democracy.  
Through a contextual South Africa jurisprudential approach, this research considers the ways 
in which an anti-democratic contention can be dispelled through deeper insight into the 
workings, guidelines and self-consciousness of the judicial institution. 
Starting from a broader constitutional standpoint within the counter-majoritarian dilemma, 
stage one of the argument is that the court is not applying its own will but the will of the 
people through the interpretation and application of the Constitution (interpretative 
contestation notwithstanding for the time being). Chapter 4 views democracy within the 
broader scheme of constitutionalism and the Constitution. Through the analysis of the South 
African Constitution’s negotiation, adoption and certification, this chapter offers the argument 
that democratic will exists within the constitutional scheme and the court is a crucial  
institution towards fostering democracy within South Africa.  The people’s consent is 
expressed in the Constitution. This chapter will make the contention that understanding the 
nature of the constitutional enterprise means that to fully effectuate that consent and to read 
the Constitution in light of the here and now, there must be reliance on an open judicial 
mandate.   
Chapter 5 examines democratic theory within judicial review. Moreover, evidence of 
democratic theory within judicial review would challenge the notion of judicial preference 
within judicial review. This chapter espouses certain guidelines that the court follows that 
constrain and channel judicial review. Embracing the work of the Critical Legal Scholars, the 
contention is that in reaction to the history of the nation, bright leitmotivs have emerged that 
guide constitutional adjudication. While these leitmotivs may invoke some democratic 
impetus, the chapter acknowledges the idea of advanced consent, whereby the 
transformative mandate of the Constitution may lead to disconnect between public opinion 
and judicial decisions, albeit a decision that is consistent with the leitmotivs.  This leads to the 
understanding of a need for a distinction between political consensus and a moral consensus 
when discussing the counter-majoritarian dilemma. Emerging from this, the argument is 
extended to reveal that if minority rights can be guided by the concept of dignity; there can be 
connection, a tying of the fates, between majoritarian belief and minority rights. Dignity is the 
nexus. Embracing the work of the deconstructionists, the chapter details how the judicial role 
can be used in the interpretation and extrapolation of these leitmotivs towards a resolution 
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that both admits of democratic origin and carves out a space for minority protection with 
majoritarianism.  
Chapter 6 argues that judicial preference is not imputed into judgment as a result of 
indeterminacy but rather that judicial preference is steered toward a democratic accord, 
indeterminacy notwithstanding. The considerations of South Africa as a young democracy 
and the need to avoid charges of judicial subjectivity create, it is argued, a self-conscious 
court who has displayed an unwillingness to stray beyond the textual bounds of the 
Constitution. Deriving from such deference, the chapter assesses whether this faith in 
formalism can adequately reflect a democratic commitment and whether such a judicial 
strategy is appropriate to mask judicial preference. It further examines whether this faith in 
formalism as a means to circumvent the counter-majoritarian dilemma results in an abdication 
of judicial role within a constitutional democracy. While arguments have been made up to this 
point of the external guidelines that the court must factor into its judgment as means of 
constraint and direction, such a rational is predicated on a certain type of judicial officer who 
is willing to make an external appraisal, to acknowledge and accept such constraints. This 
leads, therefore, to a discussion of the deconstructionist views regarding internal preferences 
and how interpretative meaning is formed. This includes how interpretative meaning is 
constrained by performative value and the professional ego. It acknowledges subjectivity but 
argues that that subjectivity is already formed through a pre-existing normative framework in 
which case the judge cannot be seen to be operating outside of a democratic reality. As a 
result, this research contends that judicial subjectivity is the best indicator as to what we as a 
democratic society, in line with our commitments, feel is just.  
The composite of these chapters endeavours toward the argument that judicial subjectivity 
does not necessarily translate into nihilism. In the alternative, however, the research will also 
contend that the understanding of nihilism and the awareness of nihilism within adjudication 
prevents, to a greater extent, judicial preference. In addition, nihilism can be seen to 
engender a rejection of majoritarianism and indeed create the space for minority voices to be 
heard. The chapter evokes various judicial strategies to avoid nihilism and mechanisms to 
retain judicial legitimacy within counter-majoritarian contentions of interpretative 
indeterminacy and nihilism.  
Finally this research ends with an analysis of four minority rights judgments in Chapter 7. This 
chapter will point to evidence of constraining judicial guidelines and evidence of the 
democratic accord within the South African Constitutional Court that argue a rejection of the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE COUNTER – MAJORITARIAN DILEMMA 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The counter-majoritarian dilemma is an American idea that originated in Alexander Bickel’s 
seminal work, The Least Dangerous Branch.53 First published in 1962, this book has had a 
profound effect on American constitutional scholarship. It sets out the conflict between an 
unelected judiciary and democratic principles as a “deviation” in American democratic ideas.54  
The counter-majoritarian dilemma underscores the tension between democracy and 
constitutionalism. The concern that this dilemma poses in a South African context is that this 
tension is viewed as zero-sum, each seemingly incompatible with the principles espoused by 
the other.55  As constitutional democracy is viewed through such a bifurcated lens, there is a 
danger in pushing too hard in enforcing the constitutional mandate onto a polity that exists in 
a new and thus potentially unstable democracy. The chances of meeting institution-ending 
resistance are far greater than one would have in a mature democracy.  
There are two lines of argument deployed by the counter-majoritarian dilemma. The first 
argues that the people’s will is not represented in the text of the Constitution and that, as the 
Constitution ages, the democratic deficit between the people and this outdated text will 
increase. The second line of argument emerges from the first, arguing that as this time 
increases, so does the judicial role and the judicial freedom in interpretation.56   The central 
core of the counter-majoritarian dilemma is, therefore, the issue of judicial subjectivity.  
Outside of a question of academic scholarship for constitutional theorists, the counter-
majoritarian dilemma is used in response to specific decisions made by the court that some 
would not agree with.57 Thus the counter-majoritarian dilemma relates not just to the 
theoretical institution of judicial review itself but specific case results that emerge therefrom. 
This would presumptively be decisions that the majority (whether political or normatively 
                                               
53
  Bickel The least dangerous branch.  
54
  See also Friedman 2002 Yale L J 153-259. 
55
  Froneman J “The possibility of constitutional democracy" in Botha, van der Walt, van der Walt 
(eds) Rights and democracy in a transformative constitution (Sun Press 2003) 93; Dyzenhaus 
1991 SAJHR 26. 
56
  Michelman F “Forward: traces of self-government” 1986 Harvard Law Review 4-77 16; Bickel 
The least dangerous branch 16-17: “When the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a 
legislative act, it thwarts the will of the people of the here and now.” 
57
  Friedman 2002 Yale L J 165; Mohamed 1998 SALJ 663. 
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statistical) oppose. Indeed this is implicit in the very name chosen by Bickel. There is 
therefore, a joinder of minority rights within a conceptual critique of the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma. Interpretative indeterminacy has created the response that such judicial power in 
interpretation must therefore be ceded back to the legislature which has a greater democratic 
mandate to work with such indeterminacy. This however, abandons the problem to majority 
rule process and raises the question how there can be protection of minorities within such an 
advocacy? 
The necessary examination of the counter-majoritarian dilemma, toward a full landscape of 
argument, can be broken down into three concentric issues. The dilemma can first be viewed 
from a broad perspective of the role of constitutionalism and the written Constitution’s 
commitments. Following this examination, there can be a narrowing of focus to view the 
dilemma in light of judicial review and finally viewed through an examination of judicial 
subjectivity.  
 
2.2  The counter-majoritarian issue with interpretation  
 
A formalist interpretative approach, rooted in the text of the constitution can lead to certainty 
and apparent objectivity.58 The judiciary’s application of concrete rules can ideally be seen as 
a way to avoid judicial activism as a formalist approach can be seen as neutral and a-
political.59 The landmark American case of Marbury v Madison 60 that would uphold judicial 
review as legitimate operated on the assumption of a written constitution providing answers in 
a mechanical fashion, made abundantly clear in the text.61 Textual clarity underlies the 
entirety of the judgment. This interpretative strategy has come to be criticised and if the 
reasoning of Marbury v Madison, long used in defence of judicial review, falls away, the 
legitimation of judicial review must fall with it. 
Considering South Africa’s history, it must be acknowledged that when a formalist approach 
to law on the part of the judiciary helped to entrench the apartheid atrocities, the court, in 
                                               
58
  See Kroeze IJ "Power play: a playful theory of interpretation" 2007 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 19-34. 
59
  Kroeze 2007 TSAR 20. 
60
  Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
61
  Bickel The least dangerous branch 73 -74. Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action 
Campaign and Others (no 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para 99 (hereinafter referred to as 
Treatment Action Campaign). “In so far as that constitutes an intrusion into the domain of the 
executive, that is an intrusion mandated by the Constitution itself.” 
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reaction, has moved towards a value–driven culture of justification.62 Section 39 of the 
Constitution mandates this interpretative strategy, noting the “values of an open and 
democratic society” and section 39(2) holds that the court must “promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.”63 This is the value-based strategy that emerges from the 
Supreme Constitution. The notion of upholding the spirit of the constitutional enterprise 
thereby creates an obligation on the part of the judiciary that transcends the mechanical 
application of the constitutional provisions. It demands a holistic and teleological interpretation 
rather than a strictly literal interpretation.64 
This results, paradoxically, in a text-based directive to engage in non-formalist reasoning. 
However, the Constitution cannot be engaged through a value driven directive without 
viewing the Constitution substantively. The Constitutional Court has raised the values in the 
Constitution to an objective status.65 The space for value judgments has been opened and yet 
this move towards a substantive approach to adjudicative reasoning may seem to open the 
door for judicial subjectivity. Fagan argues that turning away from rule-based decision making 
results in judgments that are guided by moral reasons.66 Arguments have been made that it 
opens the door for the unbounded free-play of the judicial mind.67  
                                               
62
  Du Plessis 2000 CILSA 228; Kentridge J and Spitz D "Interpretation" in Chaskalson M et al 
(eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (Juta Cape Town 1996) 72 ; Cockrell A “Rainbow 
jurisprudence” 1996 South African Journal of Human Rights 1-38 1; S v Makwanyane at para 
302. See also South African Law Commission Working Document 25 Project 58: Group and 
human rights (1989); Dyzenhaus 1991 SAJHR 42. For a contrary view, see Kroeze IJ “Re-
evaluating legal positivism – or positivism and fundamental rights: a comedy of errors” 1993 
South African Public Law 230-236, where Kroeze argues that such a view of positivism stems 
from a misunderstanding of what positivism actually means. She denies the narrow and 
predominant view of positivism as the command theory or the intention theory. Embracing the 
work of leading positivist writers, Kroeze understands positivism to engender judicial oversight, 
and legislative limitations that suggests a transcendental nature of law, a law that stems from 
morality. In addition, such writers support the idea of fundamental rights within positivist law. 
Therefore, the self-conscious constraint on the part of the South African jurist to not make the 
law and merely to apply the law is not congruent with a broader and more complete definition 
of positivism. Such a constraint would thereby seem to stem from a judicial strategy deriving 
from extra-legal workings based on an understanding of a perhaps submissive judicial role. 
Positivism would thereby not be as constraining on the judiciary. Such an understanding must 
be imputed into the broader argument around the ‘shortcomings’ of positivism in the counter-
majoritarian argument and the area of judicial purview in working with formalist law. 
63
  Emphasis added. See also K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) at para 
17.  
64
  Kentridge and Spitz Interpretation 7; Baloro and others v University of Bophuthatswana and 
Other 1995 (4) SA 197 (B) 227 E-G (hereinafter referred to as Baloro v University). 
65
  On the objectivist stance of the court regarding values, see Kroeze IJ "Doing things with 
values: the role of constitutional values in constitutional interpretation" 2001 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 265-276. 
66
  Fagan E “In defence of the obvious: ordinary meaning and the identification of constitutional 
rules” 1995 South African Journal of Human Rights 545-570 559; Fagan E “The ordinary 
meaning of language – a response to Professor Davis” 1997 South African Journal of Human 
Rights 174-178 177: “It is not clear to me that we can preclude a court from one day using the 
interpretative lassitude to which Professor Davis subscribes in order to ignore ordinary 
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A deeper focus on the counter-majoritarianism dilemma reveals that the concern is not about 
subjecting the will of the people to the Constitution but subjecting the will of the people to a 
subjective interpretation of the Constitution. The rise of the interpretative turn 68 and post-
modern hermeneutics results in a plain text, objective reading of the Constitution being 
questioned. In this regard, the contention is that the judge is not applying the law, but creating 
the law. The subjectivity inherent in textualism leads to the presumption that there is an 
infusion of a judge’s personal preferences into adjudication.69  
 
That the majority operates under a Supreme Constitution raises the point that what is enacted 
in the legislative sphere is presumptively believed in their mind to be constitutional. So when 
the issue reaches the point of judicial override, what is being suggested is not that the court is 
upholding the Constitution in light of unconstitutional activity but upholding the court’s version 
of constitutional interpretation over the majority’s version of constitutional interpretation. Such 
a contention is further strained when it is suggested that the court’s version of interpretation 
stems from a preference coloured reading of the Constitution. It could be argued that the 
court is able to make such an attestation due to its role in minority rights protection that would 
not be adequately represented in the majoritarian view of what is constitutional. This does 
emphases however, the manipulability of the Constitution as well as the connection between 
minority rights and the court within discussion of the counter-majoritarian dilemma. 70 
 
If the court were to deny its obligation to value-judgment and turn to a positivist understanding 
of the Constitution, it would not resolve the issue.  Engaging in formal interpretative strategies 
does not preclude the issue of judicial subjectivity. The assertion that meaning of the 
                                                                                                                                              
meaning and impose upon the Constitution a reactionary interpretation.” Hutchinson A “Part of 
an essay on power and interpretation (with suggestions on how to make bouillabaisse)” 1985 
New York University Law Review 850-886 862; Du Plessis 2000 CILSA 239; Seidman L Our 
unsettled constitution: a new defence of constitutionalism and judicial review (Yale University 
Press New Haven 2001)10: “Many sceptics have complained that this manipulability of 
constitutional doctrine means that judicial judgments are inevitably political. To the extent that 
one thinks of constitutional law as providing a politically neutral method of resolving our 
disputes, this criticism is on target.” and at 49: “The great open textures clauses of the 
Constitution, Dworkin claims, are subject to a “moral reading” which will, inevitably, be 
contested by those who approach the clauses with different moral theories.” 
67
  Kroeze 2007 TSAR 27. 
68
  Schlag 1990 Tex L Rev 1666; Boyle J “Is subjectivity possible? The post-modern subject in 
legal theory” 1991 University of Colorado Law Review 489-524 496. 
69
  Villa-Vincencio C A theology of reconstruction: national building and human rights (Cambridge 
University Press 1992) 92; Motala Z and Ramaphosa C Constitutional law: analysis and cases 
(Oxford University Press, Cape Town 2002) 51. 
See http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Newsmaker-Revolution-nostalgia-rule-Gwede-
Mantashe-20150628 in which Mantashe claims “You think judges fall out of the sky without 
being influenced by society...judicial purism…does not exist in real life.” Schlag 1990 Tex L 
Rev 1642: “Then we come to understand that the text itself is a creation of the interpreting 
subject.” 
70
  Dworkin R “Equality, democracy and the constitution”1990 Alberta Law Review 324-346 325. 
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constitutional provisions can be derived from a plain text reading, standing autonomously, 
must be contested. Increasingly, the rise of the interpretative turn has "unsettle[d] the belief 
that deference to linguistic form guarantees objective interpretation, uninfluenced by the 
interpreter’s inarticulate premises."71 Friedman argues that judges have come to be seen as 
self-determined actors, rather than instruments to apply constitutional logic.72 In this regard, 
Davis has doubts about the idea of semantic autonomy.73 The concern that emerges out of 
such an understanding is the undermining of the connection between the rule of law and the 
certainty of such law.74  
The values that underpin the South African Constitution are clear, yet the content and 
understanding of values is read into the text by each person who engages with the text. A 
judicial officer could counter such claims of subjectivity through an acute awareness of his 
characteristics, position and through an ability to subject himself to critical examination. Davis 
argues, however, that even in the conscious divorcing of these identity-forming factors, there 
are composites of influences throughout one’s life that shape one’s outlook without even one 
being aware that one’s thoughts, positions and convictions are so shaped and conditioned. 
This is what is meant by inarticulate premises.75 It raises the question as to whether critical 
examination will be enough to counter claims of judicial subjectivity and preference within the 
law. 
Emerging from this interpretative contest is the notion that all viewpoints, all interpretations of 
the scope of the values demarcated in the Constitution are equally worthy.  This is the realm 
of nihilism.76 Foundational values that are to guide constitutional interpretation as higher laws 
are amongst themselves in conflict and as Singer notes, in the absence of a meta-theory, 
resolution comes down to choice.77 Any choice made in this regard as to what the content of 
a value should be is then a choice that excludes other equally valid interpretations. The 
attempt at certainty becomes a tool of exclusion and one that is inconsistent with equality.78   
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This post-structuralist engagement with the Constitution enhances the claims posed by the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma. Text-based adjudicative reasoning is just as indeterminate and 
subjectively formed as a value-based interpretation. Alive to these difficulties is the idea that 
court cannot interpret a written document as it stands without engaging in interpretation 
coloured by personal preferences or moralities. There is then a supposed connection 
between the judge and the text. The evidence of this claim of judicial preference is further 
revealed in the counter-majoritarian dilemma’s calls for a representative judiciary.79  A desire 
for a representative judiciary presupposes the subjectivity of the law. Singer summarizes the 
central issue of the dilemma and one of the key questions that this research seeks to address 
when he asks: "Is the realm of judicial action, then, inevitably governed by whim and 
caprice?"80 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DEFINING DEMOCRACY 
 
3.1  Introduction  
 
An in-depth analysis of the concept of democracy is aimed at finding evidence of a re-
imagining of democracy beyond the traditional line of thought. The purpose is to determine if 
such a re-imagining can support the idea of democracy that is not diametrically opposed to 
judicial review and the judicial protection of minority rights. 81 
The concept of democracy is a deeply contested and indeterminate one. Democracy 
traditionally has not been viewed beyond majority rule stemming from free and fair elections.  
The faith in majority rule processes stems from the reaction to South Africa’s past – whereby 
the problem was understood to be not a lack of constitutional principles and rights protection 
but a lack of democracy in terms of not letting the people be heard.82 Such a narrative further 
suggests that fundamental rights were a conduit to majority rule through elections and nothing 
beyond that point. This diverging understanding between democracy and rights would mean a 
defence of rights protection through judicial review would be viewed as opposing democracy. 
The endeavour is toward the merging of these concepts increasingly viewed as dichotomous. 
Toward this goal, what follows is a rejection of democracy as unrestrained majoritarianism. 
This chapter provides an exposition of what it means to define democracy as “by the people”, 
a definition that encompasses concepts of equality, listening to a multitude of voices, 
tolerance of difference, deliberation, openness, transparency and accountability. These 
concepts underscore true democratic functioning and far from being anti-democratic, this 
chapter will argue that within the current South African context, judicial review is the 
mechanism that is the most suited, and most capable of allowing the people’s voice to be 
decisive. 
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3.2  Rejecting Majoritarianism 
 
Ely holds that, for moral relativists, due to the interpretative indeterminacy and deadlock, 
there is a need to have faith in majoritarian democracy.83 But this leap from moral nihilism to 
majority-rule as a solution is not without problems. The 1821 American case of Cohens v 
Virginia 84 upheld that people’s will must be regarded as the “whole body of the people.” For a 
section of that people (however dominant or majoritarian) to make decisions, particularly 
decisions that will have constitutional impact, can thereby be seen as a “usurpation” of the 
power or will of those whose will is represented in the Constitution. Thus democracy, or the 
people's will, must be seen as all-encompassing and not exclusive and discriminatory based 
on the outcome of a majority rule process.85 
 
A minority group cannot be denied the political freedom of self-government assured by the 
Constitution based on the self-government of the majority. 86 From this standpoint, minority 
self-government cannot be denied without in some way undermining the claim to one’s own 
self-government. Accepting the idea of justice as fairness, the principle that one cannot be the 
judge of one’s own case must be acknowledged with regard to majority rule.  It is contrary to 
fairness for the majority to be able to prescribe the limits on its own power.87 In this regard 
majoritarian democracy is inconsistent with justice. 
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Hutchinson1985 NYU L Rev 876; Prince at para 147: “Disturbance of established majoritarian 
mind-sets are the price that constitutionalism exacts from government.” 
87
  Dworkin Taking rights seriously 142; see also Rawls J A theory of justice (Harvard University 
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Deconstructing the counter-majoritarian dilemma is a precarious task in that, within the 
dilemma, the advocacy of judicial review is seen as opposing democracy.88 It becomes 
challenging to walk the tight rope that Roux speaks of.89 The tension between 
constitutionalism and democracy is increased if such a rejection of a majoritarian conception 
of democracy is proposed in South Africa’s democratic infancy. To that end, it is strategically 
prudent to raise an argument that offers support for the majoritarian people's will to be uplifted 
and protected from arbitrary power through the role of the court. 
 
The case of S v Lawrence considered an argument that “freedom implies an absence of 
coercion.”90 Minority freedoms being subjected to majoritarianism in the absence of rights 
protection could indeed be deemed coercive to minorities. Paradoxically, the freedom 
assured to minorities through the role of the court translates into less disruptive and less 
contestable prevailing of majoritarian will in the political sphere.91 
 
A democratic government is a government that acts as an agent of the people and serve the 
people’s interests. The counter-majoritarian dilemma paints an “us and them” scenario: the 
court versus the people. But it is not two parties – it is three: the court, the people and the 
government.92 For judicial review to be seen as popular sovereignty reinforcing, there must be 
a separation between the government and the people because the government’s interests 
and the people’s interests may not be the same. Within such discourse of the counter-
majoritarian dilemma, the role played by special interests, private power, the constitutions and 
rules of political parties, party loyalty and corruption that discolour the pure republican ideal 
cannot be ignored.93 
South Africa is a republic. The country is not run by democratic will. It is run by the decisions 
of representatives; these representatives being chosen through a process that quantifies 
democratic will. There is a vast chasm of distinction between these two points. Burke 
reasoned that a representative should not apply the will of those whom he represents but 
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rather the representative should apply his own judgment.94 He adds that a representative 
must do what is good for the nation as a whole and not what his constituents believe to be 
right and just. So within this understanding, neither the will of the majority nor the minority are 
represented in the Parliament of a republican state. If one speaks of a quantitative majority 
and minority, the process of judicial review is not eleven justices overriding 50 million South 
Africans but rather eleven justices overriding the unconstitutional decisions of the legislature. 
Judicial review does not override the will of the majority but the will of the representatives of 
that majority. This is a crucial distinction and when weighed within this understanding, the 
scales of judicial review do not seem so democratically unbalanced. 
Furthermore, Michelman offers an interesting recasting of republicanism. Traditionally viewed 
as communitarianism, republicanism would entail a rejection of otherness and would operate 
as a consolidated normative majority. Michelman argues for a conception of republicanism 
that would be “plurality-protecting”.95 
 
3.3  Democracy as popular sovereignty  
 
The direct focus of this research is the examination of judicial review as it relates to minority 
protection within a broader scheme of democratic will. A supporting argument can be made 
however that judicial review is crucial to the serving of the majority interests. As is mentioned 
above, the connection between minority and majority interest is imperative toward resolving 
the counter-majoritarian dilemma and consolidating minority rights. 
The constraints on power that arise through constitutional supremacy being upheld through 
judicial review can prevent tyranny and thus judicial review can be seen as reinforcing 
popular sovereignty. Thomas Paine points out the distinction between election and 
representation, noting that the former does not guarantee the latter. Paine argues that if 
checks and balances do not continue after elections, “candidates are candidates for 
despotism”. 96 
The workings of judicial review provide a resource for not only minority protection but majority 
advancement and concretisation. When the government does not fulfil the mandate for which 
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it was elected, the people find themselves in the same unprotected boat as minorities. Such a 
possibility has become reality in South Africa. In his exposition of recent South African 
political events, Paul Hoffman speaks of “oppressed minorities” and “forgotten masses” in the 
same breath.97 
In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes conjures the image of chains that connect the mouths of those 
in power to the ears of the people.98 These chains, that Hobbes calls civil laws, provide 
accountability, transparency and openness between the leaders and the people those leaders 
serve. It is a check on absolute power, a way to ensure that the people are being served; that 
the people can know when their leaders are doing something of which the people would 
disapprove. The principle of constitutionalism with its commitment to judicial review is the 
chains of which Hobbes speaks. The court's protection of civil liberties is thereby the 
mechanism that ensures that democracy survives.99 This is a notion echoed by Ely when he 
describes the process of judicial review as “representation-reinforcement” and the court as 
“the perfecter of democracy”.100 Beyond this view of democracy as the people’s will, the 
charge that judicial review is anti-democratic cannot withstand the lengthy list of cases where 
the court has protected democracy in its narrow conception of fair and free elections and one 
person one vote.101  
In this procedural working of the court, the court does not impose its own will but rather 
removes any blockages that would impede the people's will from being the governing will. The 
role of the court in reviewing government decisions brings the state closer to the republican 
ideal.102 In this line of thinking, Davis notes that, in the absence of constitutional neutrality 
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posed by post-modernist interpretative workings, a circumventing goal of the Constitution 
must be to facilitate deliberation. This belief underscores the need for a framework of 
individual liberties to ensure true communicative action and equality of engagement.103 
In the case of Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and 
Others104, the court emphasised the connection between conceptions of democracy and 
openness, transparency and accountability ensured by the court. Democracy is viewed in this 
regard as a justification of power rather than a granting of absolute power to the majority.  
Much has been said about the need for popular support of the court's decisions but the 
inverse is also true. Viewing judicial review more systemically, the court, as a light-house that 
shines values and principles, has the potential to frame an issue as a constitutional issue or 
as something that is constitutionally indigestible. This framing of the issue by the court can 
then lead to society changing stances and policies to fit the constitutional framework,105 and 
beyond that, the court possess the ability to point out the connection between concepts we 
hold in common. The constitutional stamp by the court has the potential to spur change and 
embolden those who wish to fight for it.106 Thus Rostow argues “the work of the court can 
have, and when wisely exercised does have, the effect not of inhibiting but of releasing and 
encouraging the dominantly democratic forces.”107 
 
3.4  Democracy as difference and deliberation 
 
Democracy must be conceptualized as considering all voices.108 For this pluralism to be 
achieved there must be a foundational premise of equality in deciding collectively how we as 
a nation will govern ourselves.  
 
Herzog maintains that democracy is not the result of preference; it is the process of 
deliberation.109 Langa echoes the sentiment that “finding common ground calls for 
deliberation, collective reflection and an open space for discussion; it does not mean silencing 
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difference.”110 Sachs surmised in the case of National Coalition that equality is not about 
homogenisation, not subjugating difference into one colourless narrative – equality is about 
respecting difference.111 Identifying democracy as equality means that the argument is 
removed from quantitative notions of democracy. Democracy as equality moves the argument 
away from majoritarianism as the collective becomes the individual. 
 
Democracy and the conception of equality are inextricably linked.112 Equality is the very 
concept that allows for the existence of minority rights in the face of majoritarianism. One can 
argue, therefore, that democracy and minority rights are linked. This is argued for by Sachs in 
the National Coalition case.113 Following this reasoning, democracy conceptualized beyond a 
mathematical majority rule is congruent with the court upholding minority rights.  
 
If democracy is equality, the institution that best manifests equality will be the institution that is 
the most democratic.114 As the South African political structure is dominated by one party, it 
could be argued that the power derived from such dominance means that the party can afford 
to be intolerant of difference.115 Due to such dominance, democratic reasoning and 
deliberation find a better home in the judiciary.116  
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The traditional counter-majoritarian dilemma rests on an understanding of democracy as 
representative democracy. The problem is that representative democracy presumes a 
homogeneous society where all interests are the same thus all interests are able to be 
represented.117 But in a heterogeneous society, minorities are unable to be adequately 
represented through majority-rule processes. Not just in terms of representation but the ability 
for self-rule is diminished. While the prima facie counter-majoritarian argument is that the 
court’s role means a loss of democracy for a majority, when democracy is viewed holistically, 
there is a greater loss of democracy for minorities. In this regard, the shortcomings in 
democratic dispensation can be remedied by constitutional supremacy. Ely notes that the 
Constitution caters for a “strategy of pluralism”. Where those who are not adequately 
represented in the political realm, can still have their voices weighed against majoritarian 
dominance. 118 This is echoed from a South African jurisprudential standpoint in Doctors for 
Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others:  
A vibrant democracy has a qualitative and not just a quantitative dimension. Dialogue 
and deliberation go hand in hand. This is part of the tolerance and civility that 
characterise the respect for diversity the Constitution demands.
119
 
 
Continuing this line of thought, the concern with the court’s counter-majoritarian dilemma has 
been described by some authors not as counter-majoritarian but rather counter-
conversational.120 Viewing democracy as deliberation certainly supports such an idea. The 
court has been found to be conversational in its obligation to listen to such a variety of voices. 
The court cannot be seen to be counter-conversation and thereby, cannot be seen as 
counter-majoritarian.  
This idea of dialogic strategy is seen to extend beyond just the applicants before the court 
and is seen as dialogue between the spheres of government. Constitutionalism is infused into 
political and into the normative. This adds further support to the view the separation of powers 
doctrine does not translates into insulted silos.  
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When judicial review is needed, it presupposes that a legislative act has potentially infringed 
rights and freedoms. Injury or alleged infringement is a requirement before the judiciary is 
endowed with jurisdiction. It is the function of the legislature to legislate, based on a 
democratic mandate. However, if there are failures in the legislative process, the judiciary has 
a role to play. This leaves the judiciary vulnerable to charges of being anti-democratic when it 
was the legislature’s anti-democratic tendencies that bought it to that point.121 The more the 
principles of democracy are ignored at the legislative level, the greater the action of the 
judiciary will have to become.122 Michelman123 surmised that there is a reason why it is called 
judicial review – the court is meant to play a secondary role, only when there is a belief that 
the legislature has failed in its section 7(2) constitutional124 mandate to uphold the Bill of 
Rights.  
 
The concept of equality is constantly expanding.125 Although the Constitution does not 
necessarily change, the meaning keeps expanding, not through the role of the court in 
creating law through alleged judicial activism but through the application of democratic 
principles because “law is socially constructed”.126  While extending rights to those groups 
may be against the majority’s will, what can be seen is that minority rights emerge through the 
workings of democratic theory and are thus in some way linked. There is not, as the counter-
majoritarian dilemma suggests, a contradiction. 
 
The judgment in Doctors for Life127 separated the idea of democracy from the notion of 
elections and thereby majoritarian politics. The court, in demanding that the nature of 
democracy be viewed in light of South Africa’s history, can thereby be seen to link democracy 
with conceptions of equality, non-discrimination and non-oppression; conceptions that support 
the existence of minority rights. 
 
Minority rights protection emerges from constitutional sources outside of section 9(3)128 as the 
concept of minority is two-fold. Beyond the non-discrimination provisions of section 9, minority 
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rights must be defined as a positive right, as an ability to forge an identity.129 Here the 
constitutional rights regarding freedom of association and freedom of expression are 
necessary components for minority rights protection. 
 
Rights are the necessary precursor to full democratic engagement. Democracy seen as “of 
the people” can only be established as true (in terms of both stemming from the people and 
stemming from their will) if it is preceded by “the ability of the people”. Constitutional rights 
provide a framework to facilitate, ensure and protect such ability.130 Accepting that democracy 
is the ability to be self-determining or the people to be self-governing, viewing minority rights 
as a constituting force that allows one to be self-governing, means that upholding minority 
rights is upholding democracy.131  
It is easy to see however that how the debate is presented will determine the outcome. 
Recasting of democracy can be used to counter the counter-majoritarian dilemma yet this 
could be challenged as merely a selective understanding of democracy to suit the objective of 
this research. In response to such a potential challenge, a broader spectrum of contested 
democratic theory is not denied. Whether democracy is cast as minority rights protection 
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Nozick denies that there is one conception of Utopia. Rather he believes that Utopia is a 
framework that allows all people can create and live out their own constructed Utopia. National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 
(2) SA 1 (CC) at fn 50; Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para 50-51 (Ackerman J minority 
opinion) (hereinafter referred to as Ferreira v Levin); Villa-Vincencio A theology of 
reconstruction 81: “the recognition that human wellbeing or happiness (utility) is not univocal. 
Whose version of well-being is to be the measure of good in an unequal and heterogeneous 
society?” Ntlama 2014 LDD 80 -91 underscores that the philosophy of Ubuntu entailing an 
embracing of otherness and non-discrimination in the face of difference is the necessary first 
step that allows participation in communities. Michelman 1988 Yale L J 1501,1505. 
131
  Oriani-Ambrosini, MP v Sisulu, MP Speaker of the National Assembly 2012 (6) SA 588 (CC) at 
para 49: “South Africa’s shameful history is one marked by authoritarianism, not only of the 
legal and physical kind, but also of an intellectual, ideological, and philosophical nature. The 
apartheid regime sought to dominate all facets of human life. It was determined to supress 
dissenting views, with the aim of imposing hegemonic control over thoughts and conduct, for 
the preservation of institutionalized injustice. It was this unjust system that South Africans, 
through their constitution, so decisively seek to reverse by ensuring that this country, fully 
belongs to all those who live in it.” 
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through individual rights and the concept of equality and difference, whether cast as self-rule, 
“we the people” or cast as majoritarianism, representation through elections, or dominant 
thought or normativity; the below examination of judicial review reveals that judicial review 
supports all these definitions of democracy. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DEMOCRACY IN THE CONSTITUTION 
 
“At that constitutional moment, We The People, establish our own sovereignty 
by legislating to ourselves a supreme law.”132 
 
4.1  Fostering Democracy 
 
The discussion below seeks to reveal the underlying democratic structure of the Constitution.  
Mandated to determine whether the draft Constitution complied with 34 constitutional 
principles that were drafted into the Interim Constitution,133 the Constitutional Court was the 
mechanism that would straddle the divide between majority representation and minority 
protection. It could be argued that the 34 constitutional principles and the Interim Constitution 
would have provided minority safeguards prior to elections but it must be questioned how and 
who would interpret and apply these principles. Subjecting the interpretation of minority 
safeguards to a majority assembly would defeat the very purpose of constitutional principles; 
as these principles must be immune to majority politics. It further underscores the 
manipulability of principles and the belief, although perhaps not fully articulated at the time 
considering the faith placed in formalism - that principles cannot be self-applying. An 
institution outside of majoritarianism was needed. 
 
The Constitutional Court was to be the “guarantor and guardian”, the very thing that held 
together the parties solemn pact. Rickard suggests that without the mechanism of a court 
certification, transition into democracy through the chosen negotiated channels could not 
have been achieved.134 This is a key point that arguments of counter-majoritarianism or anti-
democratic challenges to the court must take into consideration. 
It is suggested, however, that parties may not have supported the draft as it stood but rather 
were voting to have the court decide on matters that had reached impasse during 
                                               
132
  The Federalist No 78 (A Hamilton) http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed78.asp (date 
accessed 01/08/2015). 
133
  Schedule 4 of the Interim Constitution. 
134
  Rickard “The certification of the constitution of South Africa” 228; Preamble, Interim 
Constitution: “And whereas in order to secure the achievement of this goal [a new democratic 
order], elected representatives of all the people of South Africa should be mandated to adopt a 
new Constitution in accordance with a solemn pact recorded as Constitutional Principles.” 
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negotiations.135 The idea that the court’s role in this certification would be seen as counter-
majoritarian and anti-democratic was not raised by any parties involved.136 All evidence 
supports the idea that democracy was fostered by the court’s role. 
 
4.2  Consent 
 
The constitutional framework within which the court operates is a product of consensus. 137 
Called the “principle of institutional settlement”, the judgment of constitutional validity or 
invalidity lends itself to legitimacy because it is a judgment that has been made though a 
recognised procedure and institution.138 Legitimacy can be achieved in one of two ways. One, 
the rule is accepted as valid by the people who are governed by that rule. Two, the rule is 
accepted because the process used to adopt that rule is regarded as valid, thereby validating 
any rules that emerge from that process.139 In this regard, when the court applies rules that 
the community may not agree with, it can still be seen as possessing legal legitimacy 
notwithstanding popular illegitimacy. As society requires legal legitimacy, the court’s rulings 
may be seen as in line with the community mandate, even though it may not be in line with 
community will.140 This does however presupposes clarity and objectivity of the law and the 
objectivity of the judiciary applying that law. 
Minority rights can be seen to be accepted because of the recognition of the judicial institution 
despite perhaps non-agreement with the minority right that the institution would espouse. 
There is thus a connection between institutional legitimacy and an acceptance of decisions 
that would not be accepted outside of this institutional faith. Unpopular decisions have a 
                                               
135
  Rickard “The certification of the constitution of South Africa” 229. Such a suggestion was 
confirmed in S v Makwanyane at para 25 in re the issue of the death penalty that had reach 
impasse and the decision was to leave the matter for the court to decide. 
136
  Rickard “The certification of the constitution of South Africa” 229-230: “all the parties, minority 
and majority, fully accepted the role which the court was about to play, and made much of its 
importance in the whole constitution-making scheme.” 
137
  Currie and de Waal The new constitutional and administrative law 66. 
138
  Eskridge and Peller 1991 Mich L Rev 722; Michelman F “Dilemmas of belonging: moral truths, 
human rights and why we might not want a representative judiciary” 1999 UCLA Law Review 
1221-1252 1237. 
139
  Dworkin Taking rights seriously 20; Mohamed 1998 SALJ 662. 
140
  Eskridge and Peller 1991 Mich L Rev 716: “The morality of law lay not in fundamental 
agreement about substantive principles, but instead in the open structures and procedures of 
government, the process by which we can govern ourselves notwithstanding disagreements”; 
Seidman Our unsettled constitution footnote at page 17. 
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tenuous stability and are dependent on a faith in the institution by the people. A loss of 
institutional legitimacy will lead to minority protections being put in jeopardy.141 
 
4.3  Consent, openness and the need of the judiciary 
 
The originalist interpretative strategy whereby judges raise the founding thought as evidence 
to support their plain text readings of the Constitution endeavours to impute some democratic 
legitimacy in judgements.142 When contesting the counter-majoritarian nature of the court, this 
argument of the people’s consent within the Constitution is an important starting point. 
However, the challenge within this argument is the wealth of evidence to suggest that 
founding thought should not be decisive in terms of offering judicial directive. The 
shortcomings of the idea of the people’s consent will be discussed below through three 
different points. Firstly, deeper analysis reveals a democratic deficit in originalist reasoning.143 
Secondly, such reasoning denies the organic nature of any successful and enduring 
constitution. Thirdly, originalist reasoning is a flawed argument when the nature of the 
constitutional climate at the time of adoption is examined. These three points combine to 
reveal the necessity of judicial workings toward an interpretation that is truly reflective of the 
people’s consent. 
The Constitution is a document created in conflict and designed to be an “unfinished 
symphony”.144 In addition, “it is not framed to be a catalogue of answers to questions.”145 
When this is added to the primary objective of constitutional adoption, and getting parties to 
consent to such a Constitution, it skews the content of the document towards immediate 
goals of adoption rather than lasting ideas. To this end, the Constitution brushed over the 
                                               
141
  Ngcobo 2011 SALJ 7. 
142
  Bickel The least dangerous branch 98; Ely Democracy and distrust 9 quoting Thomas Grey: 
When a court strikes down a popular statute or practice as unconstitutional, it may also reply to 
the resulting public outcry: “We didn’t do it – you did.” 
143
  That is democracy / self-rule of the people at this time. 
144
  Davis D “Cases and Comments: The twist of language and the two Fagans: Please Sir may I 
have some more literalism”1996 South African Journal of Human Rights 504 -512 508. The 
United States of America’s constitutional birth has been viewed as not one nation conceived in 
liberty but rather “one nation, conceived in argument” that emerges from the research of 
Dionne Our divided political heart 127 (This is a reference to Abraham Lincolns’ Gettysburg 
Address 1863).The constitution is an imperfect settlement. In the South African context, 
Kentridge and Spitz Interpretation 107 suggest note that “agreement on a written text was 
possible only on condition that the ideological tensions would remain – and visibly so – to be 
negotiated and renegotiated every time the text is reread with an interpretative eye.” 
145
  Bickel The least dangerous branch 103; Kruger R and Govindjee A “The recognition of 
unenumerated rights in South Africa” 2012 South African Pubic Law 195-209 197; Kentridge 
and Spitz Interpretation 32. 
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most divisive issues.146 Furthermore, what is needed to be achieved is a Constitution of 
generality so that the constitution would have not only the ability to grow but to be general 
enough to be stable and permanent. What is meant by this seeming contradiction of abilities 
is that if the Constitution is general enough, all parties would be able to invoke the 
Constitution for their protection, and all parties would be able to see in the Constitution the 
vindication of their point of view. In doing so, the constitutional enterprise will maintain the 
allegiance of the people and the Constitution will thereby remain.147 All of these factors that 
surround and inspire the type of Constitution that is adopted point to a difficult examination of 
the concept of consent - one that is not capable of automatically being known by glancing at 
the constitutional text. While the judiciary may look to the history of adoption as an ingredient 
of adjudication toward upholding what the people have agreed to; what must also be noted is 
the need of the judiciary to bring forth the product decisions of that consent. 
To have enough flexibility to allow for interpretation in terms of the political moralities and 
realties on the day, to uphold the will of the people at this time and to prevent a chasm 
between public opinion and the rule of law, the framers of the Constitution intentionally left 
room for the abstract principles to be interpreted by the judiciary. The court held in S v 
Makwanyane in this regard that their adjudicative role was due to “the framers of the 
constitution hav[ing] imposed …an inescapable duty.”148 The framers would have been 
unable to predict future circumstances and this argument lends itself to the notion that the 
framers intended deference to the judiciary as a result of such vagueness. However, this 
vagueness must not be seen as the entry way to judicial whim and the creating of law but 
                                               
146
  Bickel The least dangerous branch 104; Villa-Vincencio A theology of reconstruction 86-87; 
Michelman 1988 Yale L J 1512:  “Perhaps we can imagine people being persuaded to accept 
the requisite beliefs arguendo and suitable to the immediate, urgent, practical work of resolving 
upon some constitution while continuing to deny there deep truth (or rightness or inevitability).” 
147
  Bickel The least dangerous branch 105. Kruger and Govindjee 2012 SAPL 202 reference the 
First Certification judgment where the court refused to establish a concrete right to family. It 
was felt that there were too many conceptions of what constitutes family in the diverse South 
African context. Defining what constitutes “family” and what type of family is worthy of 
constitutional protection and what type is not would create insiders and outsiders. Thus the 
solution was to provide no answer. “The failure to constitutionalize the protection of a particular 
family form avoids disagreement.” The court held that the right to family life could be protected 
through extension of the right to dignity. This was successfully achieved in the latter case of 
Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) 
SA 936 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as Dawood). This allows for the extension of family life to 
a much greater extent than what would be achieved through enumerated constitutionalism and 
an extension that provides for a greater democratic self-rule. However, this must be paid in the 
coin of the judiciary facilitating such an extension and the judiciary having some constructive 
leeway to extend the scope of the right to dignity. The court however, has been conscious of 
and circumspect with the leeway afforded to them. See First Certification at para 3: “to avoid 
pre-empting decisions in such cases, we have endeavoured, where possible, to be brief and 
provide reasons for our decisions without saying more than is necessary”; Villa-Vincencio A 
theology of reconstruction 87. 
148
  S v Makwanyane at para 192. 
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rather the intention being that this vagueness would allow the judiciary to be receptive and 
responsive to the needs of the day, anticipate prevailing ideologies and imbue that in their 
interpretation.149 
The Constitution is meant to be a settlement to avoid civil strife. An unreflective, out of date 
and rigid constitutional settlement is ultimately likely to result in questioning, not just the 
decisions that result from the rigid application, but the acceptability of the enterprise as a 
whole. This is the great paradox: that too much settlement will cause conflict.150 Emerging 
from such an understanding, to ensure continual constitutional agreement (agreement to 
settlement and constitutional constraints) there must be, paradoxically, less settlement. Being 
able to change internally constitutional understandings, to re-examine and re-engage with the 
settlement again and again throughout changing times means that the constitutional 
objectives will be able to continually and safely rest on a normative foundation as it moves 
through the years.151 This ability must be necessitated by flexibility of the Constitution. Put 
differently, the Constitution must be able to bend, or it will break. 
The examination of the idea of consent within the Constitution has revealed that one, the 
judiciary is needed to fully effectuate such consent and, two, the ability of the judiciary to 
achieve such an objective must rest on an open Constitution. However, this does little to 
negate the concerns of the counter-majoritarian dilemma. In fact, it exacerbates such 
concerns through the advocacy of the open and extensive judicial role. It merely raises more 
questions about the nature of judicial review and the issue of morality. If the court has to 
interpret the constitution in the light of current political morality, that might be seen as the 
court acting as a censor morum with all the problems that brings. However, that is not the 
only way to see this. Far from the unconstrained mandate that such openness seems to 
suggest, the openness stems from an understanding of the importance of democratic impetus 
within the Constitution. That in itself provides constraint. In addition, the following chapters 
outline the awareness of the court in a young democracy and the strategic need to circumvent 
any anti-democratic contention. As a result, the court anticipates a restrained and deferential 
role. Moreover, the clear guidelines and adjudicative tools used by the court greatly remove 
any contention of an unbounded judicial mind in the South African context. 
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  See the deconstruction section below that will argue that this is not so much a conscious 
process of anticipation and incorporation. Rather prevailing ideologies will already be 
unconsciously part of judicial reasoning. See Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) 
SA 786 (CC) at para 69:  “The courts have a particular responsibility in this regard and are 
obliged to ‘forge new tools’ and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal [to 
vindicate rights]”; Baloro v University 227 E, 241 A-B. 
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  Seidman Our unsettled constitution 43. 
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  Seidman Our unsettled constitution 44; Baloro v University 241 E-F. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE COURT’S GUIDELINES 
 
 
[That judicial review] is still subject to important constraints, and recognition of those 
constraints is the best guarantee or shield against criticism that such a system of 
judicial review is essentially undemocratic.
152
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The openness and judicial freedom required to affect the interpretative mandate laid out in the 
Constitution, the disillusion with faith in plain text readings and the intricate connection of the 
judicial role to any living Constitution can create the idea that the court has the capacity to 
implement its own will, its own preferences and not the people’s will. This is not hard to 
imagine when such indeterminacy of law is met with judicial freedom. The indeterminacy of 
law is the starting point of the counter-majoritarian dilemma. However, there are still 
guidelines and constraints on the part of the court. 
Following these guidelines steers the court away from preference and towards a democratic 
mandate. As Singer reasons, indeterminacy does not automatically translate into 
arbitrariness.153 The central counter-majoritarian contention that a "[rejection] of crude 
textualism in which the text speaks with a clear and single voice" translates into "textual 
nihilism that celebrates the multiple, anarchic voices of the text" ignores these guidelines.154 
Singer states that context, shared understandings, an awareness of institutional roles, and 
factors that emerge from outside of a formalist understanding of law will create a composite of 
guidelines that will create predictability. These guidelines are discussed now in greater detail.  
                                               
152
  Matiso at 594 D. 
153
  See Singer 1984 Yale L J 1-70; Nozick Anarchy, state and utopia 318: “We will have to leave 
room for people’s judging each particular instance. This is not by itself an argument for each 
person’s judging for himself. Nor is it the only alternative to the mechanical application of 
explicitly formulated rules the operation of a system wholly dependent upon choices without 
guidelines at all”; Davis Democracy and deliberation 47 fn 83: “That is not to suggest that I am 
advocating an approach that anything goes so that the text is irrelevant and the judge simply 
concludes that her intuitive feeling gives rise to the best interpretation. This accusation is the 
favourite ploy of positivists – either the text has a correct meaning or you are on your own in a 
world of complete discretion. In contrast, I acknowledge that we are involved in interpretative 
work, but the process is about competing interpretations and outcomes each of which requires 
justification. That the text gives indicators as to which justification is in keeping with the nature 
of the constitutional enterprise is clear. That which is more in keeping with the communities’ 
conception of constitutional society is likely to prevail.” 
154
  Hutchinson 1985 NYU L Rev 863; Dworkin Taking rights seriously 126; Matiso at 597 I-598 B: 
“This does not mean that Judges should now suddenly enter into an orgy of judicial law-
making. Judicial review…is still subject to important constraints.” 
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5.2  Bright Leitmotivs 
 
South Africa’s emerging out of its apartheid past imbued the legal system with meta-
narratives that have guided constitutional interpretation by the judiciary. Critical Legal 
Scholars (CLS) argue that "history allows itself to become a source of moral insight."155 In 
addition the CLS posit that "law…neither operates in a historical vacuum nor does it exist 
independently of ideological struggles in society."156 
The court operates within the framework of the Constitution as memorial and the Constitution 
as monument.157 The memory of the past informs the values and aspirations of the future and 
these aspirations will serve as guideposts in interpretation. Given that South Africa is still very 
much living in its history and in reaction to that history, interpretation made in light of a 
contextual purposive understanding is thus possible within an intentionalist and originalist 
understanding; an interpretation that resonates with a democratic authorship.158 While 
conscious that tension between democratic will and the court's activism within a constitutional 
democracy is increased due to South Africa’s anti-democratic history and democratic youth, 
that tension, through the above reasoning, is paradoxically guided toward resolution through 
South Africa’s youth and history.159 In the openness of the interpretative text, the presumption 
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  Hutchinson and Monahan 1984 Stan L Rev 233; President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1(CC) (hereinafter referred to as Hugo) at para 41: "The 
achievement of such a society in the context of our deeply inegalitarian past will not be easy, 
but that that is the goal of the Constitution should not be forgotten or overlooked." Hoffman at 
para 37: "Prejudice can never justify unfair discrimination. This country has recently emerged 
from institutionalised prejudice. Our law reports are replete with cases in which prejudice was 
taken into consideration in denying the rights that we now take for granted.
 
Our constitutional 
democracy has ushered in a new era - it is an era characterised by respect for human dignity 
for all human beings.” S v Makwanyane at para 218: "The emphasis I place on the right to life 
is, in part, influenced by the recent experiences of our people in this country. The history of the 
past decades has been such that the value of life and human dignity have been demeaned.” 
Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2004 (5) SA 331(CC)  at para 68: "for all the reasons 
embedded in the racial, cultural and religious bigotry of our unequal and bruising past, pre-
constitutional courts have not recognised Islamic marriages as valid marriages.” 
156
  Hutchinson and Monahan 1984 Stan L Rev 206; Klare 1998 SAJHR 150. 
157
  Du Plessis 2000 Stell L Rev; Kentridge and Spitz Interpretation 68. 
158
  Bizos Odyssey to freedom 542. According to Bizos, this democratic participation was indeed 
evident when it came to drafting South Africa’s constitutional framework: "Those wanting to 
comment on the draft constitution formed such a broad cross-section of society that it seemed 
the judges were being asked to hear the ‘people’s voices’ directly." Kruger and Govindjee 2012 
SAPL 200 look to the reasoning of Ferreira v Levin that the Constitution’s written text will still 
have congruence with the dominant meaning in society and be written with sufficient detail to 
cover eventualities of the current time. There is not a great gap between original text and 
current adjudication as one would find in an American jurisprudential context. In this regard, 
the role of the court in construction and extrapolation of unenumerated rights occurs to a 
lesser degree. This reasoning is further established by Davis Democracy and deliberation 27 
in his acknowledgment of the theory of dependent reasons. 
159
  Paine Rights of man 389. This history in the law brings with it its own sense objectivity by what 
Schlag 1990 Tex L Rev 1645 refers to as providing “stabilization and universalisation of the 
gaze of the observer.” 
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is that constitutional precepts will be given “concrete expression…in accordance with 
reasoned sense of justice.”160 While this offers democratic assurance, it is important to note 
that this must not be read as majoritarian will when identifying that sense of justice.161 A 
central tenet that provides an overarching framework for constitutional values, and perhaps a 
degree of explication, is the philosophy of Ubuntu.162 Ubuntu entails an embracing of 
otherness. This philosophy cannot be ignored when viewing constitutional values and must 
form the prism through which our sense of justice is viewed. The idea of otherness must 
encompass this understanding of justice and must be read into the democratic impetus.163 
Carpenter distinguishes between attitudes and values. If the court is to be guided by anything, 
it must be guided by the values of society and not the attitudes of society. Carpenter holds 
that there can be agreement to values and differing attitudes that emerge as product of the 
shared value.164 The counter-majoritarian dilemma, at this point, finds resolution by society 
agreeing on general principles of justice.165 The application of these general principles of 
justice confers legitimacy on the court166 when it finds and applies the values that are shared 
by the community at large.167 Noting such, there is not an imposition by the court. Given 
South Africa’s constitutional youth, finding such values is not difficult. Thus, directive in 
adjudication will be the values of dignity, equality, freedom of person, speech, conscience and 
belief in addition to non-discrimination, openness and a culture of justification.168 
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  Kentridge and Spitz Interpretation 7. 
161
  See the American case of Bowers v Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (hereinafter referred to as 
Bowers v Hardwick) at 196: “there must be a rational connection for the law, and that there is 
none [in the context of this case] other than the presumed belief of a majority.” 
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  Epilogue, Interim Constitution. 
163
  See Ntlama N “Reflections on the rejection of the right to sexual-orientation by the Institution of 
Traditional Leadership: lessons from South Africa” 2014 Law Democracy and Development 
80-91. Ntlama writes in response to a Traditional Leadership proposal to remove the right to 
sexual orientation from the Constitution. The conflicting relationship Customary Law has with 
many constitutional provisions that would support minority right positions leads Ntlama to raise 
Ubuntu as an argument for conciliation; arguing that traditional leadership was granted 
constitutional authority on the presumption that traditional leadership could be used as a 
mechanism to consolidate and nurture constitutional values within the community. For 
traditional leaders to deny or repudiate the non-discrimination provisions in the Constitution is 
thus a repudiation of its own authority.  
164
  Carpenter 1996 SAPL 116. See the analysis of the National Coalition and the inclusion of the 
right to sexual orientation in the Constitution below.  
165
  Currie I "Judicious avoidance" 1999 South African Journal of Human Rights 138-165 148.  
166
  Michelman F "Is the Constitution a contract for legitimacy?" 2003 Review of Constitutional 
Studies (Vol 8 no 2) 101-128 101. 
167
  See, for example, Ryland v Edros 1997 1 BCLR 77 (CC). 
168
  Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 31-48. 
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5.3  Advanced Consent 
 
The culture of justification coupled with the bright leitmotivs that guide interpretation, constrain 
the unbounded free-play of the South African judge. Within these leitmotivs there is still 
democratic justification as “principles were not hard and fast restraints derived from a non-
democratic past. They are evolved from within the democratic ethos as perfections of that 
ethos.”169  
 
The political consensus of the nation is reflected in the Constitution. There are values to 
which our nation has consented and it is these values that must guide interpretation. Based 
on this reasoning, the court’s interpretative mandate is not based on morality, but on 
principles of justice informed by the country’s past. Therefore, the constitutional framework 
within which the court operates is a product of consensus. As Carpenter notes, the 
“Constitution is a mirror of the nation’s soul”170 and Villa-Vincencio states that “a nation’s 
Constitution is a social vision of what that nation understands itself to be”171 and in this regard 
there is some congruence between the people's will and the Constitution. 
 
However, within the South African context, the idea of consensus is not without its complexity. 
The role of the Constitution has been described as a bridge.172 Inspired by a past that no 
longer exists towards a future that has yet to become realised, the court operates in an 
environment that is neither here nor there. Kentridge and Spitz concede that while no clear 
constitutional theory of interpretation operates in South Africa deriving from consensus, 
leitmotivs do offer interpretative direction, if not a clear path.173 
On the one hand, the theory, as has been touched on in the course of this research, is that 
the constitutional principles must be widely accepted for those principles to survive and in 
order to avoid a chasm between public opinion and constitutionalism. On the other hand, it 
cannot be forgotten that the Constitution is a transformative document, aspirational in its 
goals; which conveys the idea that the Constitution is a conduit towards something that has 
not yet been achieved.174 Any assessment of the will of the people being reflected in the 
Constitution must take such a paradigm into account. Thus there will be at times conflict, 
there will be an apparent discordance – but it is a conflict that has been agreed to. 
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  Bickel The least dangerous branch 67 (emphasis added). 
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  Carpenter 1996 SAPL 115. 
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  Villa-Vincencio A theology of reconstruction 52. 
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  Post Script, Interim Constitution; Kroeze 2001 Stell L Rev 268. 
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  Kentridge and Spitz Interpretation 2. 
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  Du Plessis 2000 Stell L Rev 385-394 notes the hardship in trying to work within the lessons 
learnt from what the nation once was and the commitments made from that as to what the 
nation ought to be together alongside a democratic faith. 
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The description of the Constitution as a bridge has been interpreted as meaning a bridge from 
a culture of authoritarianism toward a culture of justification.175 Within such a transformative 
mandate, the court must still endeavour toward reasoning that would incorporate the people’s 
understanding in order to be in line with this culture of justification.176 As Mureinik notes the 
culture of justification means a culture of persuasion, not coercion.177 The court, through its 
reasoning will have to endeavour to persuade the public. 
 
In the advocacy of agreed upon principles, the idea of what it means to consent to such 
principles deserves deeper examination. There has been agreement to be subject to 
constitutional supremacy, even if there is not agreement as to the decisions arising out of that 
constitutional supremacy. However aspirational the Constitution’s values, however absent 
these values are at a grass root level,178 the court is not deviating from the path laid down for 
it. There can be discordance between beliefs and judicial decisions and yet that judicial 
decision can stem from the constitutional commitments, which in turn stems from that belief.  
This idea is found in Michelman’s view of the summation of this counter-majoritarian dilemma 
when he notes that there must be “government of the people and a government of laws and 
not men.”179 There is inherent in this idea a gap between men and law. This is both 
connection and disconnection. When democracy is said to be imbued in the Constitution and 
in the judicial workings, this gap must be taken into account. 
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  See Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 31-48. 
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  Bickel The least dangerous branch 105: “The constitution must not partake of the prolixity of a 
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  Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 32. 
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  Kroeze IJ “The past is a foreign country: official public memory in South African constitutional 
jurisprudence” 2009 Law Democracy and Development Journal 50-61 57; De Vos P “The 
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Journal of Human Rights 432-465 443:  “the Constitutional Court emerged as a champion of 
the rights of the homosexual minority, regardless or maybe because of the overwhelming 
homophobia in the South African society.” See also Zylberberg 1992 McGill L J 42; van Zyl M 
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Dworkin articulated that the idea of consent must be seen as consent to the overarching 
objective of the Constitution, viewing the Constitution as a whole and not just consent to the 
individual provisions contained therein.180 
The indeterminacy argument may create the impression that the court is not applying the law, 
but in their interpretation of the law, are making the law. The interpretative anchors offered by 
constitutional values however, allows the court to use a process of reasoned elaboration. 
Starting from identifying the purpose of the Constitution, areas of controversy must be solved 
by decision-making that best reflects that purpose.181 While there is elaboration, there is not, 
as the counter-majoritarian dilemma argues, creation. In support of this idea, Nozick states 
that “there can be no new rights which are not the sum of pre-existing ones.”182 
 
Winter notes that despite the unpopularity of certain decisions,183 the judgment is still 
contingent on the understanding and agreement of the community. Judicial decision making 
is still shaped by consent and agreed upon political undertakings. Through reasoned 
argument those that disagree can be brought to see that while they may have a different 
conception of law or rights, that conception is derived from a higher concept that all would 
agree with and would consent to be governed by once their interest is reflected in that 
concept.184 “Their full force can be captured in a concept that admits of different 
conceptions.”185 
In the interaction between consent and the judicial mind, the resulting judicial decision is not 
directly representative of consent but is distilled into “generalization or schematization”.186 In 
other words, there occurs not a reproduction or a replication of meaning187 but a learned 
model of understanding. Using that model will be predicated on identifying a common pattern 
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within the scheme.188 The concept of a model is that its generalised ideas can be extended to 
new and disparate circumstances. The idea is one of abstraction and then extrapolation, not 
one of direct social congruence. Dworkin reaffirms this idea, suggesting that the moral 
philosopher must take the principles that are certain in his/her mind and then to use that 
certainty as a foundational reasoning to make decisions pertaining to that which he/she is 
unsure of.189 While the results of these abstractions and extrapolations may seem to be far 
removed from the normative fabric to the extent that it seems that judicial activism has gone 
too far, Hutchinson argues that going too far would make the judgement literally 
unintelligible.190 In addition, the court held in the First Certification judgment that while there is 
no “finite list of such rights and freedoms”, any such extension of the constitutional rights will 
be limited to what is “universally accepted” as a fundamental right.191 This reasoning reveals 
that any extension or extrapolation of rights cannot exceed the democratic reality in which 
those rights must live. 
What must be avoided is a conflation of political consent with moral consensus. There has to 
be some degree of cognitive dissonance.192 There can be adjudicative decisions that may go 
against the majoritarian will but are none-the-less still derived from majority consent to the 
constitutional enterprise and foundational value commitments. 
 
5.4  The difficulty of minority rights protection by the court 
 
In the apartheid years, because the country was dominated by a minority, incontestable 
political sovereignty was a crucial ingredient for such power to continue.193 Limiting political 
sovereignty through constitutional supremacy is therefore difficult to hold when the narrative, 
deeply weaved into the fabric of the nation, is that power is protection. There is a notion that 
power constrained is power lost. From its birth, the idea of a Bill of Rights was not embraced 
fully as it was seen as a tool whereby the white minority could hold onto power. The hypocrisy 
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of a minority run government sanctioning human rights violations now uplifting the idea of 
limited government and a Bill of Rights was not lost on the black population. The Bill of Rights 
was seen as an opposition to majoritarianism and a blockage to transformation.194 Such an 
understanding must be imputed into any contextual analysis of the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma. The view was that political freedom would not be protected through the Bill of 
Rights, but rather, because it benefited the white minority, would be a mechanism where 
freedom could be potentially blocked. 
Freedom has been described as two-fold: The ability to decide for oneself the best way to live 
one’s life, and to not be subject to arbitrary power.195 There is therefore a duality to the 
investigation of the counter-majoritarianian dilemma. When viewing minority rights therefore, 
it can be in the context of either a normative societal examination (being the former 
understanding of freedom) or an examination of political power (the latter understanding). The 
historical hostility towards a Bill of Rights could potentially conflate the two. The fear is that 
what it is to be a minority in South Africa could be seen very narrowly and in light of the 
previous minority run government. The fear is that conflating the two could jeopardize the 
broader scope of minority rights protections that exist beyond the political. So the challenge of 
limited government in the South African context is three pronged – a distrust of courts from 
the apartheid era, a Bill of Rights seen as a denial of majoritarianism toward entrenching 
white interest and the indeterminacy of constitutional law as a means where the judicial mind 
can run rampant in the advancement of such an agenda.196  
 
5.5  Minority rights adjudication guided by dignity 
 
In the lead-up to South Africa’s new democratic order, the idea of majority rule was 
optimistically to be equated with unity and thereby reconciliation: one nation formed through 
the democratic process. The focus on minority rights would thereby be seen to emphasise the 
differences that divide and would contradict calls for a unified national state.197 
Through an examination of the nature of minority rights, this conception of unity cannot be 
seen to engender communitarianism or majoritarianism but in fact carves out a space for 
minorities. Holding diversity within unity is achieved through universalism. 
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Universalism upheld the individual equality of all humankind.198 The focus was thereby on an 
“anti-difference, universalist orientation.”199 Recognition of the individual right, not a minority 
right, would remove difference from the equation while simultaneously protecting it. As such, 
universalism prompts a breaking down of the quantitative forces that would form majority and 
minority. 200 The individual right most prominent in minority rights case law is the right to 
dignity. The right to dignity has been used by the court as the guideline to provide meaning to 
all other rights. The concept of dignity has become the operational baseline.201 Davis offers a 
compelling view of dignity that can be used to solidify minority rights in the face of 
majoritarianism: 
The most basic premise of the Constitution is the unbending commitment to the 
dignity of the human being. Inherent in this commitment is the principle that all people 
have a moral right to confront and to answer for themselves the most fundamental 
questions which touch the meaning and value of their own lives. The principle that 
runs like a thread through the constitution promotes a community in which no faction 
thereof is deemed to possess such superiority of wisdom or religious insight that it can 
decide the most personal questions for other members of that community.
202
 
The right of dignity thereby becomes both a subjective and an objective principle whereby 
“every other rational being also thinks of his existence on the same rational ground that holds 
also for myself.” 203  
 
There is an interconnectedness that cannot be ignored, reaffirmed by the Constitutional Court 
in S v Makwanyane when it held that: "It is only if there is a willingness to protect the worst 
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and the weakest amongst us, that all of us can be secure that our own rights will be 
protected.” 204 
In a constitutional and democratic infancy, minority rights are dependent on a judiciary and 
the judiciary’s legitimacy is dependent on public support. Democracy and even popular 
sovereignty cannot survive without an independent judiciary. Rights are dependent on other 
rights; freedoms are expounded through other freedoms. The acknowledgment of this 
interconnection offers a response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma. Majoritarian 
commitments can be extrapolated to provide a life line for minorities because of and despite 
majoritarian will. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DEMOCRACY IN JUDICIAL SUBJECTIVITY 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
At the very centre of the counter-majoritarian dilemma, once the argument moves past issues 
of constitutional consent and constraints for judicial review based on interpretative guidelines; 
there remains the issue of judicial preference stemming from interpretative indeterminacy. 
This chapter argues that the institutional self-consciousness on the part of the South African 
Constitutional Court challenges such an unbounded judicial contention; and further notes the 
judicial self-restraint and commitment to formalism that emerges from such self-
consciousness. This chapter examines a systemic view of legitimacy when the court clings to 
formalism. It will contend that such a commitment to formalism in response to the counter-
majoritarian dilemma will in fact exacerbate the dilemma and far from removing judicial 
preference, it will merely mask it.  
The chapter then discusses how judicial preference and the internal interpretative parameters 
are shaped and confined by pre-existing societal factors thereby arguing that the people’s will 
is imbued into judicial adjudication, notwithstanding such adjudication being viewed as 
preference. 
Accepting in the alternative that subjectivity and thereby nihilism cannot be reasoned away, 
the remainder of the chapter outlines various judicial strategies in response, in addition to 
arguing that nihilism properly understood, far from the resulting default to majority-rule, in fact 
upholds minority rights to a greater extent and engenders a necessary role for the court.  
 
6.2  A young democracy and a self-conscious court 
 
There is a distinction between ability and inclination. As a result of indeterminacy, judges 
have the ability to inject their preferences into decision making.  But that is not to say that the 
ability to do something automatically translates into the inclination to do it. There are various 
considerations that separate ability from inclination.205 Dworkin agrees, noting that there is a 
vast chasm between a judge’s convictions and those convictions being the overriding 
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determining force in adjudication. The exploration of that chasm and the space that prevents 
the merging of conviction and decision is now explored.206  
The court, operating in a democratic infancy, with the legitimacy of the institution hanging in 
the balance, has treaded lightly, cautious of being charged as unbounded. The court has 
aimed to root its judgment in the text of the Constitution,
207
 in the hope that the certainty of a 
rule-bound, mechanistic application of the Constitution which will leave no room for charges 
that judicial subjectivity has been injected into decision-making.
208
 This would, ideally, 
remove the judiciary from the democratic but more accurately, majoritarian cross-hairs. 
This formalist thinking pervaded South African jurisprudence before and during the adoption 
of the Constitution. During constitutional negotiations, the striking point that has been noted 
by Davis is that both the ANC and the minority parties wished for a formalist working of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights contained therein. The ANC wished that the constitutional 
mandate would be formalist in the sense that it would be clearly defined and thus contained, 
with limited application. Outside of this limited scope of application, the ANC, as the 
presumptive ruling party, would have total authority. Minority parties, having key interests 
protected by the future Constitution, wished for a formalist mandate in the sense that 
formalism would be seen as entrenchment; indisputable, fixed, unable to be manipulated. 
Davis considers that the court’s history of adjudicative formalism may have formed a 
supposition in the minds of the negotiating parties that this tradition of formalism would 
continue.209 This faith in formalism is further evidenced in the trust placed on plain language. 
It was hoped that if drafted in plain enough language, “the complexity and contest could be 
squeezed out of the constitutional enterprise.”210  
In the course of the certification process, the court factored in issues that went beyond the 
draft text before them. The negotiations were so delicate that the court factored into its 
certification judgment, the potential ramifications of rejecting the draft text and sending it back 
to the Constitutional Assembly. The court, crossing the boundary between law and politics in 
its unprecedented role, questioned whether the political tension would survive another round 
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of negotiations should the court reject the draft.211 It could be argued that the awareness of 
the delicate political climate may have led to the court potentially certifying a sub-par 
Constitution for the sake of continued peaceful settlement. While these considerations were in 
the minds of the justices, the justices made clear during the certification process that there 
would be nothing sub-par about rights entrenchment. In the course of oral arguments during 
the First Certification, the issue of constitutional amendment by majority process was 
responded to by Justice Mohamed, who raised the “basic structure doctrine”. There is a core 
pillar in the Constitution that is untouchable, even to majorities. Any changes to this 
untouchable pillar would change the very nature and institutional framework of the 
Constitution.212 
In South Africa, the culture of justification coupled with constitutional principles constrains 
judges. The advent of the Constitution has made a formalist approach to interpretation 
problematic. But the inclusion of value-judgments does not necessarily equate with an explicit 
politics of adjudication in the non-foundationalist sense. The court has been appreciative of 
the dangers of a non-formalist approach.213 Rostow reasons that an awareness on the part of 
the court of this institutional self-consciousness; an awareness of the contestations 
concerning the appropriateness of judicial review, forms the mainspring of decision-making 
on the part of the court.  
Judicial self-restraint is, as a result, well evidenced in South African case law.  In cases of 
political sensitivity, the court has adhered to a rule-bound formalism which can be attributed 
to the constitutional infancy and the need to show faith and deference to democratic 
processes.214  
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There is uneasiness in trying to adhere to formalism working alongside a value-laden 
mandate. The court's confusion in trying to straddle both worlds is evident in S v Zuma:   
While we must always be conscious of the values underlying the Constitution, it 
is nonetheless our task to interpret a written instrument. I am well aware of the 
fallacy of supposing that general language must have a single "objective" 
meaning. Nor is it easy to avoid the influence of one's personal intellectual and 
moral preconceptions. But it cannot be too strongly stressed that the 
Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean.
 215
 
The formalist approach may be seen as an effort to avoid the counter-majoritarian dilemma 
and to preserve the court's integrity.216 Overstepping would have been detrimental to the 
nation’s delicate constitutional infancy. The irony here is that this formalist approach, a strict 
boundary between politics and law, is a politically motivated strategy, thereby raising the 
question of just how formalist the adjudication really is.   
Klare makes use of the phrase "historical self-consciousness" 217 that anticipates the 
balancing act that is needed to be performed by the court. There is an understanding that, in 
reaction to South Africa’s history, the court must be a sentinel, guarding against oppression 
and discrimination.  Yet the court must also be institutionally self-conscious, understanding 
the need for the people to have faith in democratic processes and a representative 
government. As a result of this understanding, the self-distancing and awareness on the part 
of the court is more of a constraining force than it would be on the court of a mature 
democracy.  
The court has to play a very unsettled role: to remain within the domain of the Constitution, to 
apply it without fear or favour and yet also anticipate the consequences of judgement within 
broader society as well as the ricochet effects on the institution of the judiciary. It must 
operate within an interpretative mandate that is both formalist and value-based as it is asked 
to both protect and show deference, to both step forward and step back.  
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Winter notes that this self-consciousness and the awareness of all these factors that have to 
be balanced lends itself to a detached role or role distance on the part of the jurist.218 The 
instrumentalism of the role of the judicial officer creates a large space between judicial 
opinion and judicial obligation. Balkin notes a similar dissonance when he addresses the idea 
of “role morality”.219 In addition, role distance creates an absolving force whereby the judicial 
officer can hold personal predilections and still make decisions that would be counter to those 
beliefs, decisions which would be made conflict-free when he/she upholds strategic 
responsibilities in judgment. Because of this distance between the individual and the 
individual’s role, recruiting the individual will have no effect on the outcome of the role. Role 
outcome will have to be done by coercion, not persuasion of the individual. Ostensibly, this 
coercion will emanate from outside of the judicial officer. Because of the understanding of the 
instrumental/strategic rationality of the institution, the judicial disposition is pre-empted. 
 
6.3  Turning away from formalism  
 
The formulation of the South African Constitution, in that it was certified by an institution by 
the power given through the very document that it was certifying, reveals a presupposition 
that was operating in South Africa at the time: principles of constitutionalism operate outside 
the written document. To argue that the Constitution’s plain text indeterminacy should 
therefore be subjugated to majoritarian politics ignores that the principles and constraints of 
constitutionalism operates outside the four corners of the document.220   
 
A strict adherence to formalism hand prevents the legitimacy from being threatened as it can 
claim a separation of law and politics. However, formalism prevents the court from 
interpreting the law contextually and purposively– increasing the chasm between law and 
sentiment, illegitimating the court in the eyes of the polity and exacerbating the counter-
majoritarian dilemma.221 The law is a living tree – dynamic and changing. While this may be 
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seen as stepping outside of its formalist mandate to apply the law and not make the law, the 
law adapting to changing circumstances and modernity is in fact more democratic as the 
court can interpret the Constitution and legislation in a way that is far more responsive to the 
needs of society than the original purpose the legislation sought to achieve.222  
 
It is counter-productive for those who agree with the counter-majoritarian nature of the court 
to advocate deference to the ordinary language as a means of judicial constraint. Accepting 
that a plain text, autonomous reading of the Constitution was possible, this approach is a 
short term solution that exacerbates a long-term problem of democratic authority. Davis 
reasons that "this form of recourse to ordinary language is about closure of debate and 
deliberation. Over time it will support an attempt to squeeze the political life out of the 
Constitution.”223 Michelman uses the phrase "stifling certainties".224 The preservation of 
constitutional legitimacy as the nation moves into the future and further away from 
constitutional justification through original consent cannot be attained by clinging to a faith in 
originalist positivism. The Constitution will become stagnant, unreflective, out of touch. The 
freedom afforded judges in the application of the open textured document prevents the 
document from becoming obsolete. By being able to examine the social and moral standing 
of the polity through value-based extra-textual interpretative methods, it is hoped that the 
court can take the needs of the community into account and find in its dichotomous role an 
ability to balance pragmatism and principle.  
 
The openness of a non-formal interpretative mandate, while potentially indeterminate and 
thus chancing subjectivity also opens up the space for possibility and accommodation. 
Dyzenhaus concurs, voicing that the contestable nature of constitutional law provides greater 
opportunity for democratic engagement and deliberation as to the contested meaning.225 
Such an opposition to a formalist approach to constitutional interpretation is further supported 
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by Tushnet’s view that the counter-majoritarian dilemma is to be seen as a counter-
conversational dilemma. Holding onto a formalist meaning of the law ends the conversation. 
There is domination on the part of the court through its use of formalism and so in order to be 
more conversational, to counter the counter-majoritarian dilemma, the court must abandon 
such an approach.226 
 
And yet this leads to a return to the question of contradictory legitimacy. Legal legitimacy is 
two-fold – independence, certainty and non-preference through formal judgment, and yet 
legitimacy through value judgement, allowing decisions to be made within an evolving reality 
through considerations outside of the text. The concern raised is that a rule-based approach 
is seen in opposition to a value based-approach. And each of these strategies comes with its 
own problems that cast doubt on questions of legitimacy when subjected to closer scrutiny. A 
rule-based approach creates objective overtures. The problem is that a formalist / rule based 
approach creates what has been described as something akin to a shield. Judges can hide 
behind this shield and do not have to engage in examination and reason giving through this 
use of “ad hoc technicism”.227 This is inconsistent with the culture of justification. It could be 
seen an abandonment of judicial function not to engage in substantive reasoning. Reasoning 
such as this must have consideration of political, social and institutional factors. Engaging in 
value judgments is however viewed as a subjective endeavour and thereby value-laden 
decisions could be seen as “rootless”.228 In this regard, it raises the question as to why a 
judge’s subjectivity is to have greater decisional force than the subjectivity of public 
preference. While formalism can lead to certainty, settlement and apparent objectivity, resort 
to values causes conflict. Despite consensus to values in an abstract form, there will be 
disagreement about the content, meaning and limitation of these values when they conflict.229  
 
Admittedly, there can be a point of mediation. The court is not abandoning its role to apply the 
law, as applying the law, as per the mandate contained in the Constitution, is the commitment 
to value judgments that engenders an interpretative strategy that is teleological and 
schematic.230 It is what Cockrell refers to as “soft positivism”.231 
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6.4 Clinging to formalism and why the court can’t  
 
  Auribus teneo lupum232  
This Latin phrase translates into “I hold a wolf by the ears”. It depicts a situation where both 
continuing to hold on and trying to let go, is equally treacherous.  This position, holding on to 
a wolf’s ears, best describes the position of the court.  
For judges to accept a formalist working of the law, to accept a “judicial impotence and 
automatism” does in fact, to follow Bickel’s logic, have the opposite effect of a removal of 
personal convictions that it endeavours to achieve.233 Automatism is, according to Bickel, an 
“illusion”. When judges cling to this illusion, they are emboldened by the correctness of it, but 
what this confidence leads to is decisions that are unconsidered. There is unawareness on 
the part of the judicial officer. Within this unaware automatism, personal conviction will hide, 
unexamined and unnoticed.234 Accepting this reasoning, the argument could be extended to 
reveal that awareness and a self-consciousness of the illusory nature of the law would lead to 
a judge being more vigilant about the possibility of his/her convictions within the decision. 
When those convictions are acknowledged, there is a greater chance of avoiding the 
convictions having a directive force. Indeterminacy creates what Seidman calls “epistemic 
modesty”. He contends that “we might see the plasticity of constitutional law as not a tool for 
besting our opponents but as a reason for scepticism about our own conclusions.”235 This 
reasoning must be imputed into claims of moral nihilism and into claims of majoritarianism. 
The counter-majoritarian dilemma will argue that a plain text reading cannot prevent a judges 
predilections being injected into the decision, yet counter-intuitively, acknowledging this 
possibility, and accepting it, means that it can be prevented. In the awareness of this, the 
judge will mentality retreat, and allow room for deliberative voices to contest the meaning of 
the plain text reading. The judge must be brave enough to let go the wolf’s ears for this to 
happen. Clinging to formalism leaves no room for this engagement. Ironically, his conviction 
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tells him that he cannot let go, otherwise his role will be seen as illegitimate as the judge will 
be viewed as abandoning the authoritative voice of the text. 
Bickel further mentions another reason why judges would cling to the illusion of automatism. 
Bickel notes that the legitimacy of judicial review lies in the distinction between the functions 
of the judiciary and the legislature. There is a balance between the two spheres, and to 
achieve that balance, the court must uphold principle and uphold the persistent values of 
constitutionalism.  These are the weights the court has to lay on its side of the scale in the 
achievement of balance. To accept the dissolution of the illusion is to concede that the law is 
constructed and not found and this would be to upset the necessary balance and undermine 
the concrete and absolute nature of the court's weights. Because once it is realised that the 
law is a construct, there is nothing preventing that law from being challenged and revised. A 
constructed law thereby can lead to the presumption that the vague language in the 
Constitution such as life, dignity and equality, is not meant to be unwavering absolutes that is 
the court’s duty to uphold but “invitation[s] to contemporary judgment”. While this is congruent 
with the court echoing an evolving reality as noted above, such an invitation must not be an 
invitation for the court to abandon the core commitments of the Constitution. The idea of a 
constructed law therefore becomes a critical challenge to fundamental tenets of 
constitutionalism and a severing of the ties that would anchor political decisions. So judges 
continue to hold onto the illusion to maintain their function and maintain the balance between 
constitutionalism and democracy.236  
The strategic advantage of formalism prevents claims that the court is being too political and 
creating law. Yet a deeper examination of formalism, criticism of a plain text reading, and a 
systemic view of judicial review leads to the rejection of such a strategy toward judicial 
legitimacy in the face of the counter-majoritarian dilemma. Through evidence presented 
above, the exclusionary nature of a formalist working of the law must be acknowledged. The 
obligation of the judiciary toward value-laden judgement that is generous, contextual and 
rooted in a South African reality must underscore engagement with the text where the law is 
read as less-exclusionary and offer greater protection through such value judgement. Clinging 
to formalism means that this obligation cannot be adequately met. In the court’s rush to 
divorce itself from the appearance of its own subjectivity, to defer to democratic policy or 
majoritarian processes, it must be questioned whether the court treading lightly could be seen 
as a timidity of function and a betrayal of its mandate?237 Viewing the Constitution through this 
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societal fabric, it must be questioned how the Constitution can be seen as a memorial, to 
uphold its reason d’ étre 238 and its basic structure doctrine. 
The court’s role is to apply the law and remain independent. Does a consideration of the 
political and contextual implications of its judgment suggest that the court is stepping outside 
of its purview and is therefore no longer independent? As Roux argues, the endeavour 
towards the appearance of legal legitimacy is just as necessary as institutional security within 
the system. The inter-connectedness between the two is also something that cannot be 
ignored: short-changing the former could jeopardize the latter.
239
 But as noted through the 
examination above, deference to formalism may be counter to that very judicial function, 
counter-conversational, and what Michelman deems a “flight from responsibility”.240 
 
6.5  Institutional constraints apart from formalism 
  
Dworkin is a proponent of interpretation being made in light of the character of the institution 
of the judiciary. What is understood as that character will be informed by the community. The 
success of this idea will have to be predicated on a deep understanding on the part of the 
judiciary of their place and role in the institutional make-up. Once an institutional matrix is set 
up, all interpretations can be made to accord with that matrix.  
Understanding that there is an institutional character that judges must find consistency with in 
their decisions appreciates that the constraints on judicial power are pervasive, according to 
Dworkin.241 These constraints would thereby go above and beyond mechanistic constraints of 
a rule. While the counter-majoritarian dilemma would argue indeterminacy of black letter law 
that allows for an injection of judicial preference, Dworkins reasoning would counter such 
freedom and provide constraint even in the absence of black letter law. Thus understanding 
the character of the game also channels the potential open textured nature of the law. 
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Pervasive constraints persist even in the workings of judicial discretion and cannot be 
abandoned or manipulated by a mechanistic interpretative sleight of hand. That the institution 
is prescribed its character by political history, expectation and convention, further 
acknowledges a democratic component within Dworkin’s construction toward character 
interpretative strategy.242  Reinforcing a democratic working, the permissible limits of what 
shall be taken to be in line with the character will be confined by an ingrained and 
uncontested meaning of words. Thus while judges may have room to manoeuvre in linking 
interpreting laws to accord with this character, such link is not disjunctive to societal 
meaning.243   
The openness of a non-formalist mandate, while accepting that it is prerequisite for continued 
democratic input in the law, does not quell the contention that such openness would then 
translate into the space for judicial preference  to be injected into the interpretation of such an 
open law. The section that follows addresses this issue of judicial preference.  
 
6.6  Upholding the people’s will within subjectivity 
 
6.6.1  Turning the spotlight inward on the jurist 
 
This section does not seek to advance the idea of an objective nature of law, but rather to 
lean towards the argument of subjectivity. At a different level, it seeks to offer an argument 
toward stabilization and certainty of the law through the understanding that a legal subject’s 
thought is contingent on societal thought.244 
This therefore offers a response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma as the notion of 
indeterminacy is thus disputed. Hutchinson argues that social, political and historical 
considerations play a role in shaping understanding.245 This is echoed by New Public Law 
Scholarship, which notes that preferences cannot be divorced from social context. 
Preferences are "endogenous to social structure” and are "essentially communitarian 
ideas".246 Indeterminacy of a text is therefore challenged by the idea that the societal narrative 
shapes the interpretative mandate. Rather than being indeterminate, it provides "possibilities 
and parameters".247 The social context and the shared narrative of society will dictate the 
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permissible limits of the formal rule.248 In the examination of the work of the deconstructionists 
that follows below, it is hoped to simultaneously achieve two responses to the counter-
majoritarian dilemma: the first being proof of a lack of judicial preference driving judicial 
decisions. The second line of thought involves using the deconstructionist’s argument of what 
drives judicial decision-making to support the theory that the court is not democratically 
deficient but rather democratically driven.  
Up to this point, the arguments raised have focused on external considerations that must be 
balanced by the judiciary - considerations that channel and control the judiciary’s decision-
making. In this sense, the judge has self-consciously removed himself/ herself, sat outside of 
and looked in at the moving parts that must be reconciled. This externalization and balancing 
act presupposes an objective rationality on the part of judge. It must be conceded, however, 
that externalizing the issue will not immunize the judge from his subjectivity and thus he/she 
is not immune from the counter-majoritarian dilemma. South Africa does have foundational 
commitments that could aid in constitutional decision making and much of this research has 
pointed to the clarity and directive force of those commitments in South African jurisprudence 
in a counter argument to the counter-majoritarian argument. Diving deeper, however, into the 
argument of constitutional indeterminacy, Singer notes that these foundational principles such 
as freedom, equality and dignity may at times be in conflict. The result would, in the end, have 
to essentially come down to a choice by the judicial officer.249 
 
Within in the advocacy of the constraining directives and socio-political awareness utilized in 
this research; the efficacy of those constraints still comes down to exactly that – awareness. 
There has to be internalization, an acceptance of the constraints that would precede any 
manifestation of those constraints as external. The judicial mind is still at the centre.250 The 
acceptance of the judicial role as insulated, rule bound and constrained to maintain 
independence and legitimacy is predicated on the awareness of such an understanding within 
the internal workings of that judicial officer. Turning to the work of the deconstructionists, what 
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follows is an examination of internal considerations; turning the spotlight inward on the judge, 
on his/her rationality and his/her preferences.251 
 
The counter-majoritarian argument would hold that there is nothing but the man, the jurist and 
his preference. The investigation into the interpretative turn has revealed the subjectivity of 
understanding and meaning. But this is not the inner most core of the argument. Examining 
subjectivity reveals a deeper layer. The deconstructionists’ examination of subjectivity reveals 
that there is no subject. There is not as Derrida phrases it "the full presence, the reassuring 
foundation, the origin."252 
 
6.6.2  The source of judicial preference: a deconstructionist view 
 
The deconstructionist’s investigation reveals that the preference, the subject himself and 
his/her understanding, is a reflection of cultural, historical, societal and political influences.253 
Thus the idea of a decentred subject is raised. There is internalization, an introjection of 
societal meaning and understanding that lends itself to a constructed subjectivity or a socially 
constructed subject.254 
In this regard, there is a detachment between the judge and meaning. The deconstructionists 
would argue then that the counter-majoritarian proponents have it backwards: the judge’s 
preference does not inform the meaning of a text, the text, read in the light of what is 
understood and accepted by the community at the current time, imbued with a meaning that 
society has imposed on that text, informs the judge’s preference.255 "The subject is at the 
mercy of a system of signification that always already precedes her."256  If the subject were to 
venture outside of the signifiers of meaning, and thereby outside of society's normative 
accord, the subject’s reasoning would be unintelligible, and within South Africa’s culture of 
justification, it would be a reasoning that would not be able to stand. Through this reasoning, 
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and in countering claims of legal nihilism, it is clear that judicial judgment cannot outstrip the 
democratic accord.257 
Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity elevates principle as a guiding and constituting force in 
constitutional choice, but this theory has to be predicated on a rational "Hercules"258 that 
encompasses the qualities of an outstanding jurist. It is these qualities that a jurist will try to 
project, but it is also these very qualities from which the capacity for judicial preference 
springs forth. Returning to the result of the nihilist argument for a moment, the argument 
would go that any constitutional decision would, in essence, be no more than a constitutional 
choice.259 When building a Hercules and asking a judge to project those qualities, it is imbued 
in that judge the confidence to make the right choice. After all, he is a rational jurist and a 
reasonable jurist. But as Winter notes "rational argument is exposed as just a privileging of a 
perspective.”260 The judge, believing himself/herself to be Herculean when making rational 
argument, becomes a mechanism in which political power is then consolidated and imbued 
with the symbolic potency of constitutionality. The judge’s own celebrated and sought after 
rational legal thinking keeps him as a cog in the machine, a mechanism of perpetuation.261 
This is further reinforced not just in the judge’s mind but in society at large by the narrative 
formed around an ideal judicial function of reason and application of law beyond politics; that 
judges are independent, that they will be constrained by legal thought.262 There is endeavour 
towards this narrative, and it is clung onto more fiercely in the face of and in response to the 
counter majoritarian dilemma. And as it persists, the dominant powers, the moulding forces of 
the ways of thinking, the scope of possibility within judgement, although invisible, becomes 
more entrenched. The judge in his/her role is seen, in the words of Hutchinson, not as a 
"protagonist" but as a "puppet.”263  
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6.6.3  Community driven meaning 
 
 
Meaning becomes a question of performative value. The social consequences become more 
important than the intellectual content and meaning.264 “The authoritative character of these 
rules is secured by an interpretative community.”265 There is then linkage to the leitmotivs that 
are accepted by the community, offering judicial direction and thereby not providing an 
objective meaning in law but bestowing intersubjective meaning.266 This strategy thereby 
refuses to engage in the objective contest of the counter-majoritarian dilemma by accepting 
the subjective. What must be emphasised however is that this strategy should be seen as an 
endeavour toward universalism within such community-driven constitutional meaning. 
Minority protection cannot be abandoned and as such, there is a danger that community 
interpretative meaning may be misread as majoritarian interpretation.267 The court needs to 
make the interconnection between minority and majority and identify the concepts that are 
held by all, notwithstanding differing conceptions contained therein, when identifying the 
source of this community-driven meaning. Should this connection between community 
meaning or community interpretation and judicial interpretation be accepted, it must allow for 
a universalist conception within such interpretation for minorities not to be overridden.  
 
The need for acceptability of the judicial consequences challenges the idea of indeterminacy 
and the alleged resulting judicial whim. Singer notes the key role that reputation and legal 
culture play as a determinist force. He notes that judges are constrained by legal culture268 
and the experiential reality.269 The judge not only unconsciously270 frames his reasoning in 
accordance with the societal narrative but consciously operates in a way that the 
consequences of his judgments will render his professional reputation acceptable. Being 
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conditioned to what is an acceptable performance and intertwining the professional ego within 
that matrix creates a predictability of judicial action.271 
 
Accepting that societal signifiers mould subjectivity, judicial conviction is arguably the greatest 
mechanism and representation of our own self-rule. Allowing judicial conviction means that 
the people are being self-governing.272 
 
6. 7 Nihilism and the court’s response: facilitating a democratic accord and working with 
indeterminacy. 
 
Nihilism is the result of interpretative indeterminacy where no interpretative view can claim 
greater validity than another. As a result, indeterminacy creates a loss of meaning. Therefore, 
any interpretation of the text can be challenged as merely personal preference. Nihilism is the 
result of lack of objectivity in the law.273 
 
6.7.1  The counter-majoritarian response to nihilism 
 
In the absence of constitutional law that is determinate, two responses are proposed. The first 
is that the issue becomes a decision for majoritarian politics.274 This is the only way that 
remains to make a decision. This must be challenged on two accounts. Firstly, it is to be 
governed by a government of men, but not a government of laws. Secondly, the court 
deferring to majority rule because of constitutional choice is making a constitutional choice. It 
is a choice made by the judge that is driven by his morality. Deference does not divorce 
choice or morality. As Dworkin notes, the judge does not set aside his morality in deference to 
the political but rather the composition of his judicial philosophy is such that he assess that on 
the issue at hand, the issue must be remitted to the political.275 There is judgment even when 
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there is a decision not to judge; determination made even in response to indeterminacy. The 
judge is using his role to abandon his role and abandon his obligation to protect those who 
cannot be protected through a government of men and not of laws. The concern is that once 
a determination is made, it immediately defines the space. The determination to defer to the 
political is to make that decision, imbued with constitutional potency that the issue at hand 
and all similar issues that emerge in the future belong in the public arena and are subject to 
public violence and coercion in its enforcement. 
The second response argues that because no such determination can be made, the issue 
must fall into the realm of the individual, with no constraining and coercive forces upon it.276 
Understanding these challenges leads therefore to a need to create a judicial strategy in 
response to nihilism, accepting in the alternative the need to uphold judicial function within the 
delicate democratic balance despite a contested authoritative voice of the court. The outlining 
of such judicial strategy reveals that, paradoxically, rather than abdicating to majority rule in 
response, constitutional indeterminacy creates an even greater need for the role of the court. 
 
6.7.2  The judicial strategy of working within nihilism  
 
New public law scholarship lays out the characteristics of its scholarship and its framework is 
especially noteworthy for a judiciary operating in a post-modern world, in a diverse and 
historically wounded country with competing and equally justifiable moralities. This is a 
framework that can offer a response to nihilism. Contrary to the "anything goes" belief, the 
awareness of nihilism results in a constraining directive removed of moral choice. The textual 
uncertainty can lead to a court that has a normative focus that is rooted in a contextual reality 
and is aware of the potential for growth and extrapolation of values. When arguments and 
interpretations may reach the point of deadlock, what that underscores is an acknowledgment 
of difference and the acknowledgment of a competing version. 277 
To accept a case of nihilism is to accept otherness. Going forward, majority rule cannot be 
the solution because that is, in itself, dismissive, and nihilism, that led to a defeatist majority 
rule end result, is exactly that- defeating otherness that was previously accepted earlier on in 
the same argument. The logical response to nihilism must therefore be a balancing of visions; 
an accommodation, trying in some way to bring the extremes into the centre. The court, of all 
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the institutions, is the most suited to achieve such a balance precisely because of the 
unstable and multiple considerations that it must undertake. 
The need for balance creates a multifaceted directive that suggests accommodation, 
openness and a non-absolutist conception of law278 that denies certainty and yet continues to 
keep the conversation going, continues to search despite the ‘anything goes’ understanding 
of moral nihilism. It is a conception that resonates with democratic symbiosis. 
One way for the court to avoid placing itself in the middle of morally ambiguous issues is to try 
to base its judgments on the particularity of a lower law or a focus on the particularity of the 
case at hand rather than areas of constitutional generality, as a way of providing stability in 
areas where there is great "social disagreement and pluralism."279  It is a strategy on the part 
of the court that avoids the necessity of choice.280 It is a strategy that prevents the court from 
having to make a singular constitutional definition which would thereby, going forward, have 
an under-inclusive or over-inclusive scope of the right. This is a strategy of minimalism which 
Currie notes the South Africa court’s commitment to in its decision making. The focus on 
particularity and narrowly applicable scope renders issues resolved for the case at hand but 
undecided for future contestation. Currie notes that minimalism is a legal strategy but does 
have political relevance in that it stays judicial legitimacy as the court refrains from decisions 
of finality. The ability for contest and the re-drawing of the constitutional lines and exceptions 
continues to exist.281 What this approach does is allow for conflicting interests, both 
irreconcilable and yet both constitutionally protected, to exist in the same space, without 
destroying one another. Both are able to exist without the court having to construct some 
hierarchical value system to resolve competing interests. This is a focus on community 
building, a focus that is crucial in the South African context. 
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The court should not make possibility-killing judgments that would create winners and losers, 
but provide openness and not closure. The court must adopt a jurisgenerative approach - an 
approach that must create in its judgement a space where both competing interests can be 
protected in such a manner that, in time, these interests can organically grow towards each 
other and form part of the normative framework.282 
It must be questioned, however, in the South African context where minority rights are clearly 
and constitutionally delineated whether the court would be justified in treading lightly when it 
came to protection of those rights and the non-discrimination and non-oppression of minority 
groups. The court, in its accommodation, must not venture into abdication.  
The view that nihilism translates into anarchy and thus judicial whim when it comes to 
adjudication is contested. The understanding of moral nihilism as equally worthy viewpoints 
suggests that the judge is vastly removed from his preferences because he/she must then 
consider all these competing viewpoints. The judge’s preference, rather than being the 
overriding determinist force, becomes merely one out of many preferences.283 To this end, 
moral nihilism should be seen as representation. The lack of an objective nature of law and 
the idea of moral nihilism means that "representation is inevitably interpretation." 284 The 
vantage points of all affected must be considered. This is congruent with the Constitution and 
its broadened scope of section 38 locus standi provisions. To create agreement out of such 
diversity, what is just can only be determined when all who are affected by the decision are 
part of that decision.285 
While objectivity may be met with doubt in a post-modern world, these disparate forces 
coming together can create inter-subjectivity. Emerging out of a procedural method, inter-
subjectivity can result in objective principles, albeit vague and generalized.286 Going forward 
towards a more concrete application of those generalized principles, Davis motivates that this 
inter-subjectivity is the correct response to the deeply ingrained inarticulate premises of a 
judge. The tendency, in response to such subjectivity, is to try divorce oneself, to try and 
ignore all those facets that form preference. The reaction should not be a decrease of factors 
but an increase; to acknowledge otherness and expose oneself to it. 
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Alive to the result of nihilism and the exposure of viewpoints that must proceed from it, the 
court’s facilitation of dialogue emerges as crucial.287 Michelman advocates “pragmatic, 
normative dialogue.”288 The pragmatic normative dialogue that Michelman speaks of is 
present in section 36 of the Constitution289, in that section 36 demands that the court consider 
all aspects. The court must consider the nature, extent, importance, and relationship of 
competing claims and how it all relates to the structure of an open and democratic South 
Africa based on human dignity, equality and freedom. Michelman’s pragmatic dialogue 
presupposes a pluracy of ideas and competing claims as well as deliberation; a reasoning 
that is consistent with more complete definitions of democracy mentioned above. 
 
6.7.3  The problem with representation 
 
In the search for a "universalizing standard of justice"290 that goes beyond preference, inter-
subjective investigation is therefore dependent on openness and representation. But must 
this representation necessarily be part of the judicial composition? Michelman advocates that 
a court should focus on the legal and not the moral questions as a mechanism of evasion; 
evading moral contestation and thereby frustrating the counter-majoritarian viewpoints 
emerging out of particular decisions. He notes that as a result of this, a bench compiled to be 
representative may not be ideal. The representative, aware of who he/she represents, will be 
beholden to that representative group and would have to fight for the moral argument and 
substantive value choice of that group.291 Post-modernism, equality, moral nihilism and 
hermeneutics all point to a moral battle in the court that cannot be won.292 How then can 
representation sit comfortably with a post-modern working of the court if representation is 
seen as both necessary and incompatible? 
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Michelman argues that an "empathetically connected judiciary" not a representative judiciary, 
can adequately meet the representation requirement, indeed even more so because the 
detachment from oneself in order to be empathetically connected can result in a degree of 
objectivity. New Public Law offers a similar idea to these necessary components of dialogue 
and empathy in the form of "perspectivalism" in that one should be attuned to the 
perspectives of others. It is reasoned that the holding together of a myriad of subjective view-
points can, out of that amalgamation, create objectivity293 and sit more comfortably with 
democratic theory. In as much, perspectivalism thereby upholds the worthiness of minority 
rights within the democratic conversation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ANAYLYSIS OF THE COURT’S APPROACH TO MINORITY RIGHTS 
 
7.1  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice 
and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) 
 
That the Constitution has entrenched minority rights despite a lack of public support for those 
rights can be attributed to the success of minority advocacy groups linking minority rights to 
the meta-narratives of non-discrimination and non-oppression at the time of the Constitution’s 
formation. The reaction to apartheid created what de Vos calls a "master frame or a master 
narrative" that minority groups could tap into for justification of their cause.294 Gay rights 
groups, including The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, successfully linked the 
struggle for racial freedom and non-discrimination to sexual orientation, freedom and non-
discrimination. Tapping into the master narrative was in this sense finding and identifying the 
abstract value. In addition, this cannot be viewed in isolation from the political climate from 
which the consolidation of gay rights emerged. Cameron notes the support that gay rights 
garnered from political institutions and role-players combined with the force of effective 
lobbying power toward concretisation of the right.295 Thus these minority rights, prima facie 
absent public support, derive from an extrapolation of history and institutional support.296 This 
is supported by Tushnet’s view that “the court’s intervention fails when it attempts to act on a 
specific and important issue without substantial pre-existing support on that issue from 
politically organized forces.”297  
 
As a result, gay rights were able to be included in section 9(3) of the Constitution.298 A refusal 
to include these rights in the Constitution would have been a refusal to oppose discrimination 
and oppression (the recognised pattern), the very foundation on which the democratic South 
Africa is built. The extension of these themes forms the bedrock of constitutional adjudication. 
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The right to sexual orientation falls under the right to equality whereas differentiation based 
on sexual orientation constitutes presumptively unfair discrimination.299  As a result of such a 
clearly enumerated constitutional protection, a limitation of such a right would have to be held 
justifiable under section 36 of the Constitution. In the case at hand, where applicants 
challenged the criminal offence of sodomy as unconstitutional, Ackerman J noted no such 
rational connection that would justify the limitation of the right. A limitation of a right could be 
limited when such right would cause harm to others and their rights or harm to broader 
society. The court held that there was no clear purpose and no clear harm caused that would 
justify homosexual activity as criminal other than the “moral or religious views of a section of 
society.”300 The court held that such views cannot stand as a legitimate purpose for 
limitation.301 
While applicants plead the right to privacy in the alternative, the court viewed such a claim as 
problematic to the broader scope of gay rights within society. Viewing the issue solely as a 
right to privacy in a sense reinforces that homosexuality shall be tolerated so long as it is 
hidden. It does nothing to eliminate the sense of stigma and the idea of homosexuals as 
deviant. It ignores the broader messaging of society that affects a gay person’s psyche, 
affecting all areas of their lives and contributing to alienation. It reinforces exclusion that 
would prevent those who are perceived as different from full citizen engagement. 
There is thus a prima facie view that the court has rejected moral views, norms and 
majoritarian will302 as directive. However this cannot be concluded to be thereby anti-
democratic. The under-current of the court’s reasoning suggests that the court’s view of 
democracy, and the court’s role in such a regard, is one that supports the idea of a facilitative 
framework towards full and active citizenship.303 Security of the person is the prerequisite for 
engagement, and this security must extend beyond the privacy of the bedroom. Put 
differently, difference viewed as deviant-ness and thus exclusion by a statistically normative 
community is being read by the court as an impediment to democratic functioning. In terms of 
the place for minority rights in South Africa, the court was cognisant of the interconnection, 
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highlighting that celebrating difference must be achieved if the success of the constitutional 
project is to succeed in South Africa.304 
To this end, as a point of interconnection, the court turned to the concept of dignity. Dignity, 
as viewed by the court, must be determined through placing oneself in the position of the 
other, looking from another’s perspective and viewing the issue contextually.305 Thus the 
concept of dignity, a concept that finds itself in the very centre of jurisprudential reasoning in 
South Africa, requires both an abandonment of abstract law and a double-consciousness on 
the part of the judiciary. This is congruent with the results of nihilism advocated in this 
research. Dignity thus requires both a distancing and a necessary human subjective element 
that can only be achieved through non-mechanistic judicial workings. 
The court did however endeavour to justify its findings beyond the text of the Constitution, 
citing the changing attitudes of society toward gay rights and the international, social and 
jurisprudential growing toleration of the issue.306 The court went on to state that in the 
absence of an express provision of sexual orientation, the court would still be in a position to 
find the way it did, arguing that the United States Supreme Court is imbued with the power to 
decide whether an issue falls within constitutional protection by consideration of the issue’s 
“‘nature” despite not being “readily identifiable in the Constitution’s text.”307 This reinforces 
what has been mentioned in the course of this research in regards to interpretation being 
made in line with a constitutional character and an understanding of an overall purpose of the 
enterprise and not just a text-based interpretation. Such an interpretative method would 
circumvent any formalist interpretative problems raised by the counter-majoritarian dilemma 
toward the claim of judicial illegitimacy. The court is still being bound by the Constitution 
through such an approach. The court then points to a number of foreign courts who have 
decriminalized sodomy despite not having an express provision enumerating such a specific 
right to sexual orientation in their constitutions.308 
Indeed this creates a large area for the judiciary to play, yet the acknowledgement by the 
court of history suggests a constraining and channelled directive,309 in addition to the court’s 
assertion that this judgment is reflective of an “evolving social reality”310 suggesting that the 
court is not the imposer of a will but rather the receiver of such a will that is already existing 
outside the court. 
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Toward the end of his majority opinion, Ackerman J equivocates, noting that social standards 
can prevail and society can legislate against what it finds offensive, so long as it is in line with 
the Constitution. It is clear that such a passage is to reassure the people who would not agree 
with this judgement of their power in the political sphere and the court’s awareness and 
respect of such power. What is not clear is whether such a reading of what is in line with the 
Constitution would entail a text-based express anti-discrimination provision or a broader 
reading of implicit protection that Ackerman advocates earlier in his judgment. The inclination 
is to the former, a return to a faith in positivism at the tail end of a remarkably progressive 
judgment; a move that reinforces the judiciary’s self-consciousness, despite its boldness. As 
Ackerman notes, the text-based unfair discrimination provisions allow the court to uphold 
fundamental rights while not being in danger of “over-intrusive judicial intervention.”311 For all 
the talk of value judgements, Ackerman’s equivocation leads to a subjunctive reasoning that, 
without the clearly enumerated sexual orientation provision in the Constitution, and without 
the force of lobbying power, the court may have found differently. 
 
7.2  Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 (2) SA 794 
(CC) 
 
The applicant in this case was a lawyer who was denied admittance to the Law Society due to 
his insistence that he has smoked, and would continue to smoke, Cannabis as part of his 
Rastafarian faith. Cannabis is a banned substance under statutory law. Section 15 and 
section 31 of the Constitution provide religious protections. And under such an enumerated 
right of freedom of religion, any limitation of the right would have to be reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom, equality and dignity under 
the limitation clause of section 36. 
The court in this case made great strides to emphases the importance of constitutional 
protections, and the court’s role in that protection, to those that are marginalized and 
vulnerable and who cannot find relief through legislative channels due to their lack of political 
power.312 The court reiterates that difference, diversity and dignity is a cornerstone of the 
constitutional enterprise,313 going on to cite that the beliefs should not be scrutinized or belief 
holder’s within minority religions be made to prove their faith or belief.314 Sachs J’s minority 
judgment, unequivocal in the uplifting of minority rights, the accommodation of difference and 
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the necessary limitation of majoritarian mind-sets when operating under a Supreme 
Constitution, still endeavours to tie such a belief to connections outside of the Constitution. 
He evokes historical African and traditional evidence of cannabis for religious purposes.315 
The clearly enumerated constitutional right entails a move to section 36 examinations which 
brings in factors that would not be possible through a formalist reading. The balancing that 
takes place under this section invokes the need for a contextual analysis. Sachs J, in his 
dissenting judgment, elaborates stating that balancing  
…has always to be done in the context of a lived and experienced, historical, 
sociological and imaginative reality. Even if for the purposes of making it’s judgment 
the court is obliged to classify issues in conceptual terms and abstract itself from such 
reality, it functions with materials drawn form that reality.
316
 
This is certainly consistent with the theoretical position espoused in this research regarding 
the source of judgment within interpretative indeterminacy. Within the balancing appraisal, the 
court has to consider reasonableness and proportionality, creating far more judicial work than 
a text-based reading of section 9(3) non-discrimination provisions. But it also opens up the 
space for a much wider examination of social parameters being considered within the 
judgment. It allows for the people’s will, both minority and majority, to be heard. Echoing the 
deconstructionist song, Sachs assesses  
that in the present matter, history, imagination, and mind-set play a particularly 
significant role, especially with regard to the weight to be given to the various factors 
in the scales.
317
 
This reveals that social understanding and democratic impetus will have a solid weight when 
such section 36 considerations are balanced. Sachs notes that in “the extreme positions of 
the…irresistible force of democracy and general law enforcement against the immovable 
object of constitutionalism and protection of fundamental rights” section 36 serves as a point 
of mediation, pulling each pole closer to a more balanced centre. Section 36 appraisals by the 
court does not allow for dismissal of majoritarian or legislative will even in the face of clear 
constitutional protections of the constitutional right. Such injection of majoritarian or 
community concerns in relation to minority rights comes through the work of the court. 
Chaskalson CJ for the majority believed that the issuing of permits for the excepted use of 
cannabis by the Executive would lead to an examination of who constitutes a “bona fide 
Rastafari” and such an inquisition into one’s faith would not be reconcilable with freedom of 
religion.318 Thus the court, paradoxically, held that in denying a part of the expression of 
                                               
315
  Prince at para 153. 
316
  Prince at para 151. 
317
  Prince at para 151. 
318
  Prince at para 138. 
73 
  
 
Rastafari religion, the court would be upholding religious freedom in a broader sense. Thus 
the court, in its majority judgment that justified the limitation of the right, still sought to uphold 
its function. 
The court expressly notes the lack of institutional support, lobbying and political 
organization319 and it is here, where this research makes the contention that it is for this 
reason that a judgment in favour of the minority right was not successful. It has been 
mentioned above in the course of this research the need for a pre-existing infrastructure for 
any minority rights claim to be upheld in the court, despite the court’s assertion of its role to 
protect the marginalized.320 This case provides a clear example of the point – that the court 
will not outstrip the social infrastructure and discourse but rather it will echo what is external 
to it.321 The contention is made therefore that had there been a more politically astute 
selecting of the applicant that would be the face of the Rastafarian cause, the decision may 
have gone the other way.322 The Court itself noted so when it claimed that the problem was 
the individual nature of the applicant. Had the applicant been the Houses of Rastafari and the 
priests from those Houses, the findings in terms of cannabis permits may have been 
different.323 
 
7.3  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (no 2) 
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
 
The case of Treatment Action Campaign involved whether the government had failed in its 
constitutional obligation to make readily available Nevirapine, a drug to prevent mother to 
child transmission of HIV Aids. The constitutional obligation to assess only the 
reasonableness of government policy provides a clear example of a separation of powers 
case where the court should be deferential when it comes to matters of government policy.324 
The court however did not accept that such deference would render socio-economic rights 
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non-justiciable from the start.325 The Constitution provides a core-minimum obligation toward 
the progressive realisation of the right, within available means (the idea of a core minimum 
having its origins in the United Nations). Thus despite policy implications that are not the 
court’s purview in terms of the separation of powers, what is justiciable is the assessment of 
whether the constitutional obligations on the part of the State are being performed in a 
reasonable manner. The reasonability requirement, as contained in the Constitution326 
therefore does place the policy issue in the court’s sphere. As the court noted “there are no 
bright lines that separate the roles.”327 It does, however, not permit the court from imposing its 
own idea of policy direction but merely assessing whether the policy as it stands is 
reasonable or not reasonable. It is not, in this regard, a usurping of function. 
Despite such assertion of the court’s power and constitutional obligation to decide the matter, 
the court displayed a self-awareness of the legislative and judicial parameters and need for 
circumspection.328 
The start of the judgment suggests the court has the right to be interventionist and to dictate 
to the legislature, especially on an issue that involves the protection of the weak and 
vulnerable (no more clear an example than an infant at risk to a life-threatening disease). But 
further on in the judgment, the court specifically addresses the role of the court in such an 
instance.329 The court acknowledges the respect for the separation of powers through 
reference to a litany of cases330 before re-iterating its duty to uphold the Constitution in terms 
of section 172. 331 It notes that it cannot negate its foundational duty, nor turn its back on its 
primary function: to uphold the values underlying the Constitution.332 
The court, in the need to justify that such a granting of power stems not merely through its 
own interpretation, turns to the foreign jurisprudence of the United States,333 India,334 
Germany,335 Canada336 and the United Kingdom337; all of which  support judicial 
encroachment into the realm of legislative policy. 
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The Treatment Action Campaign judgment is an ebb and flow of retreating and assertiveness. 
Despite the justiciability of policy, the court noted the necessity of a narrow scope of 
judgment. The judgment should not be of such a scope so as to arrest future policy 
development.338 Beyond the constitutional infringement of the current matter, the legislature 
and executive are still, democratically speaking, the sphere that undertakes and has a 
breadth in policy matters. And yet, the court appreciates that from a broad standpoint, policy 
must be also be transparent and open339 – a necessary component of reasonableness of 
which is in the court’s purview to assess. 
The assertive reading of the Constitution is diluted somewhat in the court’s recognition that 
the court feels comfortable making such a judgment against the policy because, at the time of 
the court hearing the appeal, the “requisite political will is [now] present” to change the policy 
in a direction that is more consistent with its constitutional mandate.340 This political will was in 
addition to the court learning of available funding for HIV prevention341- thus the budgetary 
implications as a counter to socio-economic justiciability of rights does not factor. This once 
again reveals that the court will not step beyond the social and political reality. It does raise 
the question whether the court would have found differently had the requisite political will not 
been present? 
In an effort to prevent an exacerbating of the tension within a constitutional democracy, and 
the potential for government to feel that the court order constitutes an intrusion into the 
domain which the government believes it is its own, the court belies such fears remarking 
“government has always respected and executed orders of this court.”342 
Finally, a noteworthy point about the Treatment Action Campaign judgment is the unanimity 
of the decision by the court. The judgement being written by “the court” and not an individual 
judge writing the majority opinion, suggests a consolidated force.343 Such a strategy 
undercuts the potential for criticism of the judgment though highlighting apparent 
interpretative discord within the court itself. Such unanimity is a crucial weapon within the 
contestation of the counter-majoritarian dilemma – particularly in a judgment that overrides 
majoritarian government policy. 
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7.4 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) 
 
The case of Christian Education v Minister of Education saw the South African Schools Act 
84 of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Schools Act) that would abolish corporal 
punishment in schools challenged as unconstitutional for a lack of religious exception for 
religious based independent schools. The case provides an example of competing 
constitutional values. The judgement in examination points to the factors that the court 
considers and the guidelines it follows in achieving the balance that must be sought in a case 
where both sides argue the constitutionality of their claim. The court endeavours to reconcile 
the competing claims into one coherent reading of the Constitution that allows each claim to 
be as generously upheld as possible. There is no evidence within a reading of this case, to 
suggest that constitutional values in collision translate into a resolution by judicial choice. 
On the one hand, as raised by the applicants, the right to religious liberty was sought through 
application of sections 14, 15, 29, 30 and 31 of the Constitution. The respondent for the State 
on the other hand, raised a constitutional defence for the lack of religious exception to 
corporal punishment in the Schools Act based the rights of the child, equality and dignity 
(sections 10, 12 and 28 of the Constitution).344 
The court noted the wide support received from various educational bodies, representatives 
and unions in the drafting of the Schools Act, in addition to noting participation and 
consultation in the consideration of the Applicants submission to parliament during the 
drafting process.345 
In its judgment the court once again acknowledged the role that history plays as a directive 
force, citing the violence of the past as well as the country’s international obligations and the 
international trends in other democratic countries that would sway the balance in favour of the 
Respondent.346  
While the application was rejected, Sachs J, writing for the majority, continued to uphold the 
notion of respect for difference and the refusal to have belief systems subsumed to the 
general norm. The court upheld the need for plurality as essential to democratic functioning 
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and the need for the court to protect diverse smaller groups in the face of majoritarianism.347 
Through section 36 analysis performed by the court, there is still an exposition by the court of 
that which may be ultimately limited. This exposition means that the values continue to exist 
in within constitutional discourse - that can be drawn on in defence of future minority rights 
cases. The court in this sense was still able to espouse the protection of all constitutional 
values and thereby still uphold its judicial function, even though in the specific instance, there 
had to be some limitation in the final adjudication. Once the court does make a 
pronouncement it closes down that space, it justifies and solidifies considerations that would 
lead to future curtailment – it makes a constitutional choice. In light of the culture of 
justification, the court would still have to raise the principles and the nature and importance of 
the right that, notwithstanding limitation, it has considered in the course of its adjudication. 
Thus is can still uphold principle, albeit less declarative and more educational.348 
Alive to these difficulties of closing down the space or allowing future contestation, the court 
underscored the practice of minimalism advocated for in the course of this research. In the 
areas of colliding constitutional values, the court voiced support for a narrow and prudent 
interpretation that would allow the values, beyond the particular instance, to not be subjected 
to a definitive reading that would close down the space for future application of the value.349 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
It was Thomas Jefferson who suggested that the Constitution be rewritten every 19 years so 
that it can remain in line with the times and so an originalist interpretation will not be 
needed350 and there will not be the untenable tension between constitutionalism and 
democracy. Interestingly, South Africa is coming up to the 20 year mark. Jefferson’s timing 
seems to be prophetic when the South African jurisprudential context is explored. Never 
before has the nation faced bigger threats to the Constitution, and to the judiciary that would 
apply it, than at this time. The counter-majoritarian dilemma has become the weapon of 
choice. Tactical political assaults on the court, hiding under the guise of majoritarianism and 
democracy, threaten judicial independence. Subsumed in this threat is a risk to minority 
protections ensured by an independent judiciary.  
It is noted that understanding the tension between constitutionalism and democracy at once 
appreciates the necessity of the tension and prevents the tension from boiling over into 
constitutional crisis. Therefore, this research has deployed two lines of argument in an effort 
to calm the waters but not to resolve the tension.  
The first line of argument has been a recasting of democracy to reveal that the constitutional 
function performed by the court is consistent with a broader understanding of democracy. The 
second line of argument is that judicial interpretation, and to a degree, judicial subjectivity, is 
always working within a democratic mandate that frames, guides and constrains the bounds 
of judicial discretion. This research has argued that the people’s will is, and continues to be, 
supported through the Constitution and through the interpretation and adjudication of the 
Constitution by the judiciary. The judiciary must be seen therefore, not as a democratically 
deviant institution but as a democracy fostering and a democracy protecting institution. The 
court has shown evidence of the delicate balancing act it has performed and the respect and 
circumspection shown for democracy in its limited sense while still endeavouring to uphold its 
function. 
The court’s cautious and self-conscious role, its awareness of the need to balance 
pragmatism and principle 351 in order to operate and survive in a new democracy means that 
the veracity of the counter-majoritarian dilemma in the South Africa context is diluted. The 
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court however must be vigilant in the assessment of whether pragmatism and self-
consciousness in an effort to calm the waters does not translate into an abdication of function. 
There is a formalist mandate to engage in non-formalist value judgments, teleological and 
holistic, congruent with the spirit and purport of the Constitution that exists. Such a function 
cannot be achieved though rigid and mechanistic text based reading of the Constitution. 
Within such a necessitated open mandate, the South African court endeavours towards 
operating within a three way compromise between the authority that emanates from a 
formalist approach, an individual rights protection from value-driven adjudication irrespective 
of majority sentiment, and a democratic conciliation by an examination and implementation of 
judgment that is reflective of society’s ideological leitmotivs.352 Notwithstanding the existence 
of this subjectivity, the considerations that the court must factor into its judgment channel that 
subjectivity. There are, unique to the South African jurisprudential context, constraints on 
subjectivity. Acknowledging contextual realities, precedent and expectations, traditional roles 
and extra-legal considerations, the judge’s morality becomes a rooted morality. If there is a 
morally driven decision, it is a decision that emerges out of these considerations and is 
anchored by the balance of these considerations. The judge, in his/her decision-making 
capacity, cannot thereby be viewed as unbounded. 
The deconstructionists would posit that the judge is a product of societal forces, who then 
reinforces, echoes and perpetuates that force. The idea of democracy and constitutionalism 
as partitioned concepts must be questioned by the deconstructionist’s observation of the 
interconnection between judge and society. In revealing the source of judicial preference, 
adjudication is brought within the matrix of democracy. 
The court does not operate in isolation, wilfully overriding, interfering and placing itself in 
opposition to other institutions. The court operates within a constitutional morality consented 
to by a nation that is young enough to remember why it did so. Claims that judicial review 
overrides the will of the majority are claims that ignore where South Africa has come from and 
what the nation promised to become. It is a claim that ignores that adjudication is imbued with 
a cognizance of the delicate democratic dispensation and the unique history from which we 
emerge, showing great deference to the legislature and executive. 
Part of the counter-majoritarian dilemma argues that it is anti-democratic for the people to be 
governed by an outdated text. A believed lack of democracy within the Constitution or within 
the judiciary’s application thereof leads to the argument that such governing and decision 
making should be ceded to majority rule. This challenge does not, as of yet, find a foothold in 
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South African jurisprudence. South Africa is still living through the memory of why the 
constitutional dispensation was adopted. Thus an originalist and intentionalist interpretation 
on the part of the court is possible. A large part of the court’s adjudicative guidelines stem 
from a focus on the lessons from the nation’s history. The results of this, far removed from the 
resort to majority rule, sees the end result of the counter-majoritarian dilemma examination in 
line with a minority rights advocacy while still upholding commitments made by the people. 
Moreover, it can be argued that the end result of a post-modernist exploration of judicial 
interpretation is nihilism, yet an unbounded faith in majority rule cannot be the reaction to this 
perceived nihilism.353 The response to nihilism, should, by its own logic, be accommodation of 
difference, not a dismissal of difference through majority rule.354 That is remissive of the 
problem. Nihilism, according to Dworkin, should not mean the end of the road in examining 
the counter-majoritarian dilemma, but rather just the beginning. 355 By its own logic, stemming 
from indeterminacy of law, and resulting in the non-exclusionary potential of law, it is this 
nihilism that should open the door to be more receptive of minorities.356 
While the arguments laid out in response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma suggest a 
congruency between minority rights and popular will, there is still doubt whether this argument 
can ensure stable unenumerated minority protection going forward. As memories fade, and 
new circumstances emerge that deserve an interpretation and application unsuitable to what 
was done in the past, an originalist interpretation will become less possible and less valid. 
The will of the people at the time of the constitutional adoption must be subjugated to the will 
of the people at the present time.357 The justification of the people’s will, as embodied in the 
law rule, will push up against the will of the people of the here and now. As the nation moves 
away from those justifying anchors, a conversation around constitutional literacy will be 
imperative to sustain the foundational value commitments. While moving away from the birth 
of the Constitution will place greater strain on the court in its justifications, it will also signify 
the greater need for the court to ignite those conversations about values. The court will have 
to be the living memory. 
Looking into the future, it has to be questioned whether the minority rights house has been 
built on the sand. When the seas of time wash away that sand, will the house continue to 
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stand? When the memory fades that the existence of these rights were in reaction to history, 
when the social tides change, when the institutions that supported the adoption of the rights 
no longer offer such support; will the house continue to stand?  The lineated constitutional 
rights are entrenched as a result of interest groups engagement at the time of the drafting of 
the Constitution. The concern is, going forward in to the future, when new argued for rights 
emerge that are not specifically outlined in the constitutional text, how will the Constitutional 
Court enfold those constitutional claims? There has been endeavour to tap into a central core 
of dignity as a roadmap yet rarely has the court been tested with elaboration without the 
formal Constitution providing justification through a plain text reading. When this is coupled 
with majoritarian force and attacks on the judiciary, will the court be bold enough to read into 
the Constitution protection of emerging minorities or will it undermine its legitimacy by trying 
to protect its legitimacy and betray its mandate through timidity? Will the court uphold justice 
even if it means the heavens will fall? 
 
Within a working constitutional democracy, there can be, ultimately, no resolution. The 
entirety of the constitutional democracy set-up hinges on tension; on a delicate balancing act 
that will always be in a flux of correcting and counter-correcting to maintain the balance. Any 
declarative solution will upset the tension. For the continued stability of the nation as a whole 
and for all sides, majority and minority, to be continually protected, there must be balance. 
The means to achieve this balance is through continual conversation. 
The court has been shown to be the best institution to foster this conversation. Indeterminacy 
of the law means not that the court should back down but rather such indeterminacy 
increases the necessary role of the court as the arena in which competing interpretations of 
the indeterminate text can be voiced and democracy in action can be effectuated.  
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